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Information systems designed and developed without considering security and potential 
threats create avoidable risks to the United States and the Department of Defense (DOD). 
Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) is a ground-
breaking and original approach to using systems autonomy to augment and improve the 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance process. However, UTACC will fail to 
accomplish that task if the system is not built with security in mind from the outset. To 
improve the security of UTACC, this thesis conducts an analysis to identify threats and 
vulnerabilities in the system’s concept. The goal of this analysis was to mitigate threats 
and enable mission success to UTACC-supported missions. During the initial research, a 
framework for threat and vulnerability analysis was developed based on The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
and DOD’s Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). 
This framework was used to create a threat template to analyze each threat facing 
UTACC and UTACC’s inherent vulnerabilities. The templates also include technical and 
non-technical security control strategies to mitigate each of the vulnerabilities within 
UTACC. 
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The Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) system faces 
many diverse threats and is vulnerable on various fronts, but by applying security 
mitigation strategies this autonomous technology may be useful for the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab (MCWL). MCWL’s mission is to “rigorously explore and assesses 
Marine Corps service concepts using an integral combination of wargaming, concept-
based experimentation, technology assessments, and analysis to validate, modify, or 
reject the concept’s viability, and identify capability gaps and opportunities, in order to 
inform future force development” [1]. The current squad level conceptual framework for 
the UTACC system neglects to address the inherent Information Assurance (IA) and 
Electronic Warfare (EW) concerns raised in modern warfare. Whitsett states that the 
initial survivability and IA of information systems must be identified, and a mitigating 
strategy must be validated before the development process begins [2]. The underlying 
question for this research is assessing the threats and vulnerabilities of the current 
UTACC concept of operations. 
Identifying the internal and external threats that could affect the survivability and 
information assurance of the UTACC system will serve as a precursor to identify 
vulnerabilities and nullify them. This project can contribute to validate, modify, or reject 
the viability of a team level model of the UTACC system.   
By utilizing key concepts from Information Technology (IT) literature, the 
authors analyze threats and vulnerabilities inherent within the UTACC system. This 
analysis is conducted by creating a threat template to evaluate the UTACC system. The 
template categorizes each threat, outlines related history, defines each threat, explains the 
potential impact to information held by UTACC, and provides the authors’ relevant 
assumptions. Once identified, threats and vulnerabilities are assigned recommended 
security control strategies to mitigate the risks associated with each. As the UTACC 
system is not a tangible asset yet, the analysis is not conducted on the actual system.   
 xviii 
The authors assessed 29 threats related to UTACC. The 29 threat templates are 
included in appendices A-CC. These threats were identified from the people, technology, 
and operations threat areas found in the Cyber Matrix [3]. In-depth analysis of the results 
revealed additional patterns. These patterns show some threats involving a malicious 
actor and others do not, some exist within the UTACC’s operational organizations, some 
include the technology of UTACC itself, some exist against the design and integration of 
the UTACC system, and some arise against the employment of UTACC. 
At the outset of research the anticipated areas of UTACC system vulnerability 
were within the system itself, the environment in which the system will be employed, and 
within the employing agency. After conducting our analysis two distinct patterns 
emerged. The first pattern categorizes vulnerabilities by the presence or absence of a 
kinetic or cyber malicious actor. Half of the analyzed threats contain a malicious actor; 
the rest exist within the employing organization, in the operating environment, or solely 
in the technology of UTACC. The second pattern relates to when in the life cycle threats 
emerge. The UTACC system is most vulnerable to threats during system employment 
and during design or development, and less vulnerable to threats during fielding, 
demonstration, and training. These patterns are key to understanding when the UTACC 
system is vulnerable and when security controls need to be added to the system. 
Security controls are recommended as a starting point for the mitigation of each 
threat. These are essential to the success of the UTACC system project. Security Controls 
are sorted into non-technical and technical controls; they are not exhaustive, and do not 
include mitigation strategies at the component level specific to UTACC. A subset of 
security controls repeated through a majority of threats and therefore were identified as 
important to the success of the system. 
The following security controls are recommended in the non-technical category: 
• Policies, procedures and publications must be analyzed to determine specific 
UTACC system requirements. Requirements lead to the development of 
system specifications which will drive operational employment, training, and 
integration of the system. 
• The UTACC system security policies and procedures must be developed to 
meet the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
 xix 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
• Adherence to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emission 
security.   
• Training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the UTACC 
system employment by a USMC unit.  
• Extensive testing with operational units.    
The following technical security controls are recommended: 
• Remote zeroing of software, data, and cryptographic material. 
• Employ tamper resistant technology.  
• Independent UGV and UAV operations. 
• Redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the EM spectrum. 
• Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANS)). 
The UTACC system, regardless of component configuration, will provide 
information to decision makers and the assurance of the information should be a 
responsibility of all parties involved with the UTACC system. In the design phase, 
engineers and program managers need to understand and plan for information assurance 
within the UTACC system. UTACC is on the cutting edge of technology in regards to 
information systems, but requires the same levels of protection and inherent 
responsibility to be effectively developed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis expands upon work already initiated on the Unmanned Tactical 
Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) system concepts and proposes how to 
incorporate a threat and vulnerability assessment to the system in the early developmental 
stages. 
A. RESEARCH SPONSOR, OBJECTIVE AND RESULTS 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is the sponsoring command for the 
Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) system. This 
initiative is a System of Systems that includes both air and ground components that aim 
to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of a Marine 
Corps unit. The intention of this thesis is to perform a threat and vulnerability assessment 
of the UTACC system during the design, development, procurement and operational 
employment phases. Our team will offer mitigating strategies and concepts to each 
individual threat and vulnerability. The authors have operational experience with current 
unmanned aerial systems and cyber-security threats, but have no experience with a 
system this technologically advanced. This research is a broad look into many plausible 
threats and the UTACC system’s vulnerability to each threat. Mitigating techniques will 
be comprised of best practices, policy, doctrine and procedures set forth by the 
Department of Defense (DOD), United States Marine Corps (USMC), and other 
government agencies.  
Our thesis will aim to identify ways that system design, operational employment, 
and the enemy pose a threat to the UTACC system. The following research questions will 
be addressed in our thesis: 
• What threats exist that have the potential to affect the UTACC? 
• What vulnerabilities are inherent in the UTACC concept? 
• What can be done to mitigate those threats and vulnerabilities within 
UTACC?   
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B. BENEFITS TO THE MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LAB 
As technology continues to advance, systems like UTACC present an opportunity 
for the Marine Corps to expand their capabilities with autonomous systems. Threat and 
vulnerability assessments along with the related mitigating techniques, like those found in 
this thesis, will give a foundation for the MCWL to measure any autonomous system. A 
threat and vulnerability assessment of the UTACC system will identify potential friction 
points for developers and decision makers. This assessment will aid the MCWL in 
developing policies, procedures, and standards to develop an operationally capable, safe 
and secure system for Marines to employ in combat. Autonomous systems, like the 
UTACC, increase threat avenues for our enemies to exploit vulnerabilities. Identifying 
these threats and vulnerabilities before system development will aid in developing 
requirements for both the UTACC system and other autonomous systems.  
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
As a small part of the UTACC project, this thesis will utilize key concepts from 
Information Technology (IT) literature for analyzing vulnerabilities inherent within the 
UTACC system. The analysis will be conducted by creating a threat template to evaluate 
the UTACC system and reveal vulnerabilities. As the UTACC system is not a tangible 
asset yet, the analysis will not be conducted on the actual system. After the analysis, this 
thesis will present security guidelines to mitigate the risks associate with each of the 
threats. Further research opportunities will be provided with different threat mitigation 
plans. 
D. RELATED WORK 
This thesis complements one other thesis in the UTACC program. That thesis, 
authored by Chhabra, Keim, and Rice, and in progress at the time of this writing, focuses 
on the UTACC system concept of operations and employment within the USMC. As the 
UTACC system has not been created yet, very little overlap occurs between the 
theoretical design and autonomous mapping that their thesis includes and the threat and 
vulnerability assessment in this thesis. 
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E. THE NEED FOR A THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The unique and technical nature of the UTACC system opens the door for new 
threats and vulnerabilities. A wide range of threats are capable of impacting the UTACC 
system. These threats may arise due to the technology utilized by the system; the people 
designing, procuring, employing, and maintaining the system; and the system’s 
operational environment. Threats that will target the UTACC system may require a wide 
range of security policies and procedures that must be addressed prior to employment.     
F. ROAD MAP 
This thesis presents a broad spectrum of threats and vulnerabilities with various 
effects on the UTACC system. The focus is on threats to the structure and 
implementation. This thesis is written so that the vulnerabilities and their recommended 
security control strategies can be applied to other autonomous systems with a similar 
purpose to UTACC. However, the intended audience is those designing UTACC. 
There is a five-chapter structure for this thesis. Chapter I presents an overview of 
the thesis sponsor, concepts, research methodology, problem, and related work. The 
Literature Review in Chapter II defines the concepts necessary to conduct the threat and 
vulnerability analysis. Chapter III discusses the creation of a threat template for use in the 
analysis of each threat, and the threat selection process. Each section of the threat 
template is defined and discussed in this chapter as well. The analysis of one threat and 
vulnerability assessment is covered in Chapter IV with the remainder of the threats 
included as appendices. Chapter V will present conclusions and recommendations for 
further research. 
The following is a summary of the chapter descriptions: 
• Chapter I introduces the UTACC sponsor, concepts, research 
methodology, problem, and previous work. 
• Chapter II provides the literature review of concepts, terms and academic 
work utilized to conduct this assessment. 
• Chapter III covers the creation and areas of the threat template. 
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• Chapter IV analyzes one threat template in detail with discussion on each 
section of the template. 
• Chapter V will provide our conclusions, answer our research questions, 
and provide any unexpected observations and recommendations for future 
UTACC work   
 5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the concepts and terms required to understand information 
systems and network security principles. These concepts and terms are gathered from 
various publications and policies published by the U.S. government and academia. 
Although the Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) 
system utilizes emerging technology and operational concepts, the UTACC system is an 
information system because it aids in the decision making process. An integration of 
people, doctrine, technology, and information allows a commander to gain situational 
awareness, make decisions, and implement those decisions [1]. First, this chapter 
introduces the basic concepts and terms related to Information Assurance (IA), which is 
the fundamental aspect of network security [2]. Once the concepts of IA are covered in 
detail, the threats to IA are discussed by analyzing all the elements of the cyber security 
matrix. 
IA is an essential facet of network security and by extension is vital to the 
UTACC system [2]. The concepts of confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
authentication, and non-repudiation will be the guiding principles of the UTACC 
achieving IA. Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP) requirements will guide the UTACC system 
assessment. The Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01 lays out the 
framework for Information Technology (IT) System risk management, DIACAP 
instructions and Department of Defense (DOD) policies for Information Technology (IT) 
[3]. An additional layer of analysis exists for UTACC due to its classification as a 
national security system. Understanding these concepts, processes, and procedures is 
critical in the evolution of the UTACC system to be employed by Marines on a future 
battlefield.   
The mission of the UTACC system is to increase situational awareness through 
the sharing of relevant information, which is translated into knowledge by Marines. 
Knowledge Management is the integration of people through technology to enable the 
exchange of operationally relevant information to increase performance [4]. People, 
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technology, and operations are nested in the cyber security matrix as surface areas for 
threats and must be completely understood and will be defined in relation to information 
and information systems. The overarching concept of threats and their relation to 
information and information systems must be completely understood to attain IA. 
Vulnerabilities enable a vector for a threat to exploit information systems and must be 
elucidated. A security control enables the mitigation of a vulnerability to achieve IA. 
Systems security via computer security (COMPUSEC), Communications Security 
(COMSEC), and Information Security (INFOSEC) will guide us in the development of 
mitigation strategies for the UTACC system [5]. 
A. INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
IA is a vital aspect of computer security, network security, communication 
security (COMSEC), and cryptographic systems [6]. IA is critical in enabling systems, 
such as the UTACC, to operate independently or in a networked environment. IA 
produces and defines procedures to protect signals, bits, and data as they traverse 
between systems or networks, enabling a decision maker to view information. The 
UTACC system, regardless of component configuration, will provide information to 
decision makers and the assurance of the information should be a responsibility of all 
parties involved with the design and development. DOD information systems require the 
same levels of protection and inherent responsibility to be effectively developed [7]. The 
National Security Agency (NSA) states that “information assurance is achieved when 
information and information systems are protected against such attacks through the 
application of security services such as availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation” [8]. 
The definition of Information Assurance (IA) is the means by which UTACC will 
be evaluated for utility and risk management techniques. A review of the Committee on 
National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4009 provides a full definition of 
information assurance: 
Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation. These measures include providing for restoration of 
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information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. [6] 
The importance of IA has led to the establishment of the DIACAP that will maintain the 
information assurance posture of the system throughout the entire life cycle of said 
system. The purpose of IA is not perfect security, which cannot be attained, but a risk 
management strategy for each information system. Through this process of certification 
and accreditation assurance is attained. An individual will accept responsibility for the 
system and maximize security controls to reduce vulnerabilities. 
The UTACC system should provide accurate information. The product of 
accurate information is a decision, thus the need to protect, assure, and reduce 
vulnerabilities of the information and information system, which is the end state of 
information assurance. “Information” has many definitions within military and civilian 
sectors and a comprehensive look at this term will allow an examination into the 
importance of the term. This will enable us to develop the concept of information as it 
applies to the UTACC system. First the CNSSI 4009 defines information as a 
“representation of knowledge such as facts, data, or opinions in any medium” [6]. Naval 
Doctrine Publication (NDP) 6 states “information is the raw material of decision making 
and execution” [1]. Although the definitions from these two sources differ, they both 
highlight information as a key component to knowledge and ultimately the ability to 
make decisions. As seen in Figure 1 from NDP 6, information is derived from data, 
translated into information, analyzed or fused into knowledge, which ultimately leads to 
an understanding [1].   
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Figure 1.  The Cognitive Hierarchy, from [4], shows how raw data is processed 
into understanding. 
“Assurance” is the second portion of the term “information assurance” that must 
be clearly defined and analyzed.  “Assurance,” in the context of information systems, was 
defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as the “degree of 
confidence that the security controls operate correctly and protect the system as intended” 
[9]. To obtain assurance an accrediting official makes the final decision about how much 
and what types of assurance are needed for a system and this official is the arbiter of 
assurance [9]. To have “assurance” in an information system, by definition the system 
must be protected via security controls and someone must accept responsibility for the 
system and the inherent risks of the system. 
1. The Five Pillars of IA 
The CNSSI 4009 lists five characteristics of IA: availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation [6]. These five concepts are also 
included in the DOD directive 8500.01E, which directs them to be included on the design 
and operation of a secure information system [10]. To best employ these concepts they 
must be fully understood as they relate to the information system and the environment the 
information system is going to be employed. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
are commonly known as the CIA triad [11]. Focusing only in the CIA triad, NIST issued 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 199 for the purpose of 
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creating and maintaining guidelines for the examination of an information system [12].   
DOD uses the additional two concepts of non-repudiation and authentication when they 
analyze a system. As UTACC will be a DOD information system, this chapter will 
explain the five pillars of IA. 
a. Availability 
The concept of availability is relatively simple when compared to the other four. 
The Title 44 legal definition is ensuring the “timely and reliable access to data and 
information services for authorized users” [7]. Including the word “authorized” into the 
definition is what makes this concept a piece of the overarching IA structure. Without 
this term the concept is simply defining network access. The CNSSI definition includes 
the concept of usability [6], which brings up an interesting and sometimes clashing idea 
to IA being simple. DOD still uses the 2002 CNSSI definition for availability [10]. 
b. Confidentiality 
CNSSI 4009 states confidentiality is “the property that information is not 
disclosed to system entities ... unless they have been authorized to access the 
information” [6]. An information system is said to have confidentiality if it can deny 
access to its organic information to unauthorized individuals or other systems.   
According to DOD Directive 8500.01E the DOD is still using an older definition of 
confidentially which is simpler than the CNSSI 4009 one [10]. Some academic 
definitions include in the concept of privacy within the definition of confidentiality. This 
definition includes the process by which individual systems collect and disseminate 
information [11]. Due to the scope of this thesis privacy will also be discussed. 
FIPS 199 has a differing definition for confidentiality, and because of its 
importance to the standardization process for system’s security for NIST that definition 
should also be discussed. The NIST definition is taken from U.S. law [12], which states, 
“preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means 
for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information” [7]. This is the legal 
definition and is where the usage of the CIA triad by NIST can be traced. This definition 
points at the means of providing protection and not the overall aims or desired goals. The 
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importance of unauthorized use and access are visible here as well as the importance of 
privacy. 
c. Integrity 
U.S. law defines integrity as “guarding against improper information modification 
or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity” [7]. 
The difference between this definition and the one from the CNSSI 4009 is that it does 
not include or focus on the system itself. CNSSI 4009 includes, “an entity has not been 
modified in an unauthorized manner” [6]. This focus on the system is what breaks this 
definition out from the previous one. The use of both of these definitions can lead to 
confusion of what is actually being protected, the information or the system. According 
to academic definitions system integrity and data integrity are both equally important 
[11]. The DOD definition focuses on the hardware and software of a system as well as 
the integrity of the information [10].   
Returning to the legal definition it is seen that non-repudiation and authenticity 
are legally included under integrity [7]. This explains why many only focus on the CIA 
triad and not these two topics individually. DOD has separated these two topics though 
and considers them equally important to the original three pillars of the CIA triad [10]. 
d. Authentication 
According to U.S. law, authentication falls under integrity [7], but because of the 
importance placed on authentication by DOD it will be discussed at the same level as the 
rest of the CIA triad [10]. Although it is broken up as its own topic within DOD it does 
not have a legal definition. CNSSI 4009, the IA dictionary, defines authentication as “the 
process of verifying the identity or other attributes claimed by or assumed of an entity, or 
to verify the source and integrity of data” [6]. Verifying the source of the data is known 
as data provenance [13]. The DOD definition does not include a discussion on data 
provenance, but instead it emphasizes confirming a user’s authorization and the 
legitimacy of the message [10]. Academic discussions on authentication also include the 
idea of data provenance. This means that while overlooked in the definition from DOD, 
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the concept of verifying the source of the data is important to the analysis of an 
information system especially for a system like UTACC. 
e. Non-repudiation 
Again, like authentication, non-repudiation legally falls under integrity [7]. DOD 
breaks it apart though and believes it equal to the other concepts within the CIA triad 
[10]. DOD refers to the CNSSI 4009 definition where non-repudiation is defined as “ the 
sender of information is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is provided 
with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither can later deny having processed the 
information” [10]. This provided accountability significantly increases the ability to 
investigate or analyze in the case of a security breach [11]. The concept of verifying 
orders and authority is well understood within the DOD construct and it is obvious why 
this is of great importance. 
2. Risk Management 
As with any system in today’s information environment, especially within the 
area of defense, there is an inherent risk involved with operations. How can risk be 
identified and avoided or mitigated?  CNSSI 4009 defines risk as a 
Measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential 
circumstance or event, and typically a function of 1) the adverse impacts 
that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and 2) the likelihood 
of occurrence. [6] 
That said a low-risk event would be one that has either a minimal impact, or an 
unlikelihood of occurrence. High-risk events would be either ones with high likelihood of 
occurrence, or significant impact. The process of identifying risks, conducting a risk 
assessment, implementing a risk mitigation strategy, monitoring the security state, and 
documentation of said process is known as risk management [6]. NIST SP 800–39 was 
developed by NIST to define how organizations deal with risk [14]. A major tool used for 
this is the Risk Management Framework (RMF). 
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a. Risk Management Framework Background 
NIST’s RMF is a tool used to analyze an information system to discover its 
weaknesses and required security controls. When conducting a risk assessment NIST SP 
800–30 states the RMF should be used [15]. NIST SP 800–53 [16] introduces and 
explains the RMF process. For consistency within Federal Information Systems RMF 
was developed alongside the DOD and other U.S. Government agencies [17]. NIST SP 
800–37 encompasses details on how RMF is used for Federal Information Systems [17]. 
According to this guideline RMF is only applicable to Federal Information Systems and 
not national security systems [17]. Due to UTACC’s usage and managing of intelligence 
it is classified as a national security system under Title 44 U.S. Code [7]. Regardless, the 
RMF process offers tools that can be useful in evaluating UTACC. 
b. RMF Steps 
Figure 2 shows the six steps of the RMF process. The steps of the RMF process 
approach responding to risk in a fluid fashion and enable quick response in a changing 
environment [17]. 
 
Figure 2.  Risk Management Framework, from [16], shows the steps taken in 
the risk management process. 
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(1) Categorize Information Systems 
The first step conducts impact assessment using FIPS 199 [12]. This assessment 
depicts the impact of events on the mission of an organization if said events are allowed 
to occur. It assigns a score to each threat (high, moderate, low, or not applicable) based 
on the impact of the threat to the mission of the organization. It uses the three elements of 
the CIA triad to establish the outcomes of risks if in-place security controls should fail. 
Each risk is then assigned a security categorization based on the impact assessment 
results. The potential impact to the system is determined based on vulnerability 
assessment and the analysis’ understanding of the threat’s capability [12]. Since UTACC 
is a national security system, by the legal definition [7], this exact process cannot apply, 
but the steps of conducting an analysis and determining security controls is still important 
to understand. 
(2) Select Security Controls 
This step takes the output of the previous step, the categorization, and assigns 
applicable security controls [17]. The score from the assessment of each of the CIA 
triad’s elements is used when assigning security controls. FIPS 200 [18] lists the 
seventeen possible security related areas that security controls are split into. NIST SP 
800–53 [16] defines the security controls and provides guidance on adapting controls to 
suit the vulnerability. 
(3) Implement Security Controls 
This step takes the output from the previous step, the security controls, and inserts 
them into the information system. Ideally, a new system such as UTACC, considers the 
required security controls prior to developing the system. Documenting and tracking 
changes is key to this step as changes to the information systems will need to able to be 
audited later [16]. 
(4) Assess the Security Control 
As the security controls are implemented this step will conduct an assessment of 
the implementation to ensure the desired outcome is achieved. Suitable procedures are 
used in the assessment to ensure the intended effect is attained [17]. 
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(5) Authorize Information System 
This step is more of a sanity check for the information system’s owner. During 
this step the owner will determine if the risks after implementing controls are acceptable 
for operation [17]. If the system is considered acceptable, the system is approved for 
operation. 
(6) Monitor Security Controls 
As with any process the maintenance of the effect is important. This step 
encompasses the constant reevaluation of the information system to ensure the consistent 
effectiveness of the implemented controls. If changes are required, appropriate channels 
are used to make changes to the controls to increase the effectiveness of the information 
system [17]. This step ends when the information system is no longer in use. 
3. Security Classification of National Security Systems 
As stated above, the classification of UTACC as a national security system does 
not allow the RMF process to be utilized [17]. Because of this CNSS developed its own 
instruction for national security systems, which is found in CNSSI 1253 [19]. This 
establishes the method of conducting the security classification of national security 
systems [19]. Similar to RMF, CNSSI 1253 uses those classifications to establish security 
controls. 
a. Classification Method 
An impact of low, moderate, or high is established for each risk through the lens 
of each of the CIA triad attributes. This is very similar to the FIPS 199 process. High 
impact risks are those with a disastrous adverse effect, which in turn could mean mission 
critical failure, substantial damage to assets, or significant harm to personnel [19]. A 
moderate risk impact has serious affects to mission success, harm to assets, and possible 
harm to individuals [19]. A low risk impact would have a limited affect to personnel, 
assets, or the mission [19]. 
The above classifications are based on the worst case assessment of impact 
including all factors that can affect the CIA triad, though they are evaluated separately 
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from each other [19]. One major difference between this classification method and the 
FIPS 199 is that no national security system can rate lower than moderate in the 
confidentiality category [19]. The classification of the information the systems handle is 
the basis for this rule, which is valid as the data itself has a significant role in the very 
nature of the mission. There are additional concerns for confidentiality within UTACC 
due to the information sharing between users and systems in its processes, and the 
aggregation of data within certain vehicles.  
b. Security Controls 
Similar to the RMF the next step in the CNSS method, once classification is 
complete, is to assign security controls. This is done in a four-step process. The first step 
is to assign a set of controls based on the classification using a table in the CNSSI 1253 
[19]. Next, the security control overlay is selected and applied to the risk. Third, the 
security controls are tailed to fit into the information systems for which they are needed. 
Last, the new controls are augmented with each other. It is important to acknowledge that 
all the controls available will never be able to fully eliminate all risk to the information 
system and the data within [19]. 
4. DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DIACAP) 
The Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Program is a 
policy in which the DOD shall certify and accredit information systems through a process 
for identifying, implementing, and managing IA capabilities and services [20]. It is 
essential to view any system, including UTACC, which processes, stores, and 
disseminates information across the battle space utilizing this process. This process 
evaluates defense in depth levels of IA risk reduction that applies to personnel, hardware, 
software and processes and ensure appropriate protection of these assets [20]. Defense in 
depth is a key strategy in network security, which reduces an attack vector on a 
vulnerability of a system by introducing security controls. Currently UTACC is a 
demonstration system only and the regulations surrounding the DIACAP process do not 
apply due to it not connecting to a live DOD data network. However, The DIACAP 
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process provides the framework that the authors will follow to evaluate the UTACC 
system. 
This handbook establishes a standard process to identify, implement, and validate 
standardize Information Assurance Controls (IAC), authorizing the operation of 
the Department of the Navy (DON) information systems (IS), and managing the 
IA posture for the duration throughout the DON’s IS’s life cycle. [20] 
 
The handbook also develops procedures for information assurance controls, including 
their identification, implementation, and validation [20]. To further describe the scope, 
purpose and importance of IAC’s.  
IACs are employed in such a manner that information and resources are provided 
with the appropriate level of security commensurate with mission criticality, level 
of effort, and classification or sensitivity level of information received, processed, 
stored, displayed or transmitted. [20] 
 
Information systems such as UTACC will be used for collecting, displaying, storing, 
transmitting, and receiving data or information that will be classified or sensitive in 
nature. One concern that should be addressed is deciding the classification level that 
UTACC should use to provide security for the system [21].  
The DIACAP utilizes five distinct phases in order to complete the process: Initiate 
and Plan Information Assurance certification and accreditation (C&A), Implement and 
Validate Assigned Information Assurance Controls, Make Certification Determination & 
Accreditation Decision, Maintain Authority to Operate and Conduct Reviews, and 
Decommission. [20]. To completely understand the process and how it will impact the 




Figure 3.  DIACAP Process Flow Chart, from [3] 
B. THE CYBER SECURITY MATRIX 
The purpose of our analysis of the UTACC system is to achieve IA. In this 
chapter the pillars of the CIA triad are matched against the concepts of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and security controls. To completely examine the UTACC system we 
look through the lens of the three main surface areas in which threats exist. These areas 
are people, technology, and operations. The nation’s people, technology, and operational 
experience provide the DOD with a strong foundation on which to build its military and 
civilian workforce and advance its technological capabilities [22]. Even though these 
surface areas present a strength, they also are an avenue to mount threats and exploit 
vulnerabilities. To combat these threats, security controls must be established or 
preplanned to mitigate vulnerabilities. Each of the three areas are equally important in 
evaluating an information system such as UTACC. Figure 4, the cyber security matrix, is 
a tool comprised of each of these terms, and will be used to perform threat and 
vulnerability assessment of the UTACC system. The assessment will also include the 
recommendation of security controls through the concept of defense in depth. 
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Figure 4.  The Cyber Matrix, from [23], shows the basic relationship between 
the CIA triad and threats, vulnerabilities, and security controls as they 
apply to people, technology, and operations. 
1. People 
People are an integral part of UTACC system development, will perform 
command and control functions of the UTACC system, and will utilize the information 
processed by the system. Therefore, “people” must be a part of the threat and 
vulnerability assessment. A key component to effective command and control is people 
[1]. Command and control are essential in regards to the employment of an unmanned or 
autonomous information system, like the UTACC. People, as an element of command 
and control, gather information, make decisions, take action, communicate, and cooperate 
with one another in the accomplishment of a common goal [24].  
The same people that make information and information systems effective are 
also an important part in achieving IA, which is also part of the overall goal.   People are 
the Department’s first line of defense in sustaining good cyber hygiene and reducing 
insider threats [22].   People play a major role in the defense in depth strategy by creating 
policies and procedures, training and awareness, system security administration, physical 
security, personnel security, and facilities countermeasures [8]. 
The people present a vulnerability for exploitation via information and 
information systems. People have been exposed as a weakness to IA and exacerbate 
threats to information and systems. Achieving information assurance with people must be 
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coupled with policies and procedures, assignment of responsibilities, commitment of 
resources, training of personnel, and through personal accountability [8]. The CSI 
Computer Crime and Security survey indicated that 43.2 percent of respondents stated 
that at least some of their losses were attributable to malicious insiders (people), and 16.1 
percent of respondents estimating that nearly all their losses were due to non-malicious 
people [25].   To mitigate the threats inherent in the people in the cyber security matrix 
the DOD has set the following guidelines.  
DOD seeks to foster a stronger culture of information assurance within its 
workforce to assure individual responsibility and deter malicious insiders 
by shaping behaviors and attitudes through the imposition of higher costs 
for malicious activity. This cultural shift will be enabled by new policies, 
new methods of personnel training, and innovative workforce 
communications. [22] 
2. Technology 
This section will clarify the intersection between the UTACC system and 
technology, while exposing technology as a threat to achieving IA. Although the UTACC 
system’s specific technology is irrelevant and agnostic at this point in the UTACC system 
development, the ability to identify certain technology-related shortfalls is paramount in 
understanding how to procure, protect, and operate the UTACC system. The very 
technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt 
and destroy [22]. Technology is defined as the “application of scientific knowledge for 
practical purposes” [26]. The application of technology enables the UTACC system to 
operate effectively. Pairing the terms “information” and “technology” together is the 
basis for the UTACC system.  
 Information technology is the use of “systems to store, send, and retrieve 
information” [27]. The UTACC system will conduct these tasks to ensure effective 
collaboration internally between system components and externally with Marines. The 
information that is in these different states (stored, in-transit) is what must be protected. 
The Statement of Work (SOW) states that the UTACC system will conduct intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions and with some level of autonomy [28]. 
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The task of developing an autonomous system to complete ISR missions is daunting, but 
current related technologies are being employed by all departments in the DOD.   
The DOD’s depth of knowledge of information and communications technology, 
paired with its cybersecurity expertise, provides the Department with strategic advantages 
in cyberspace [22]. The DOD may have an advantage, but technology in a system such as 
UTACC provides an avenue for a wide range of threats. One example of a technological 
threat is that software and hardware technology are at risk of malicious tampering even 
before they are integrated into an operational system [22]. This technological threat is not 
aimed specifically at the UTACC system, but must be addressed before the system is 
procured. The majority of information technology products used in the United States are 
manufactured overseas and the dependence on technology from untrusted sources 
diminishes the predictability and assurance that DOD requires [22]. A technologically 
advanced system, like the UTACC system, could become susceptible to this threat. 
Although the technology has not been fully researched, developed, or tested, the threats 
against similar and emerging technologies are present and must be analyzed. 
3. Operations 
The UTACC system should be developed to conduct expeditionary operations 
across the full range of military operations in any environment. The UTACC system will 
be expected to conduct missions in any environment to collect, process, analyze, and 
exchange information rapidly in support of operations planning and execution [29]. The 
operations area reflects on daily operations that make up the security posture for the 
organization [8]. These daily operations are unique in regards to the UTACC system. The 
UTACC system will be required to operationally integrate with air and ground elements 
of the MAGTF. This will include any organizational routines, procedures, or protocols 
that are currently in place to foster a secure and safe environment.    
The UTACC system concept of operations is being developed by another team of 
Marines at the Naval Postgraduate School. Team One provides the foundation for the 
operational employment of the UTACC system. Many factors will determine the 
operational impacts of the UTACC system, but the following are the tools required to 
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ensure that threats to the UTACC system are mitigated to an acceptable level. The NSA 
lists the following guidelines for sustaining the security posture of an organization.  
1. Maintaining visible and up to date system security policy. 2. Certifying 
and accrediting changes to the Information Technology baseline 3. The 
C&A processes should provide data to support “Risk Management” based 
decisions. 4. Managing the security posture of the Information Assurance 
technology (e.g., installing security patches and virus updates, maintaining 
access control lists).5. Providing key management services and protecting 
this lucrative infrastructure. 6. Performing system security assessments 7. 
Attack sensing, warning, and response. 8. Recovery and reconstitution. [8] 
These steps are baseline controls to mitigate the risk against UTACC system 
operations. All of these steps are critical in regard to the employment and operation of the 
UTACC system. The operation and employment of air and ground autonomous or semi-
autonomous systems will incur more operational risks that are very different from non-
autonomous computer systems.   
Autonomous systems represent a new class of devices whose security 
requirements appear to differ greatly from those of conventional computer and computer 
networking systems [21]. The system and the unit employing the system must have the 
following four steps provide assurances for how to control physical access to the system, 
which is operational in context (1) “There must be an explicit and well-defined security 
policy enforced by the system;” (2) “Access control labels must be associated with 
objects;”  (3)  “Individual subjects must be identified;”  (4) “Audit information must be 
selectively  kept  and  protected  so  that  actions  affecting security  can  be  traced  to  
the  responsible  party” [21]. Understanding the entire operational lens (employment, 
integration, and environment) is critical in identifying current threats and vulnerabilities 
of the UTACC system. 
4. Threats 
The main goal of this thesis is to provide a threat assessment for the UTACC 
system. This assessment will require a comprehensive review of the term “threat” and 
how that term relates to an information system like UTACC. The term “threat” is defined 
as the potential for a particular threat-source to successfully take advantage of a particular 
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vulnerability [15]. Threats can occur from many different things and people in regards to 
the UTACC system. A threat-source is any circumstance or event with the potential to 
harm an IT system [15]. The UTACC system is unique in that the threat source area is 
expanded due to where and how the system will operate. People, technology, and 
operations will cover the entire threat spectrum. Due to the technical nature of the 
UTACC system, cyber threats must also be discussed. Cyber threats are defined as “the 
possibility of malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a computer network or system” 
 [30]. Douglas Gage separates threats in the following manner: violations of secrecy 
(confidentiality), violations of data modification (integrity), and denial of service 
(availability) [21]. The cyber matrix accounts for all threats regardless of violation, or the 
avenue (people, technology, or operations) in which the threat will originate. The 
UTACC system will not be at risk from a threat-source if it does not have vulnerabilities 
to be exploited. 
5. Vulnerabilities 
The term “vulnerability” is also a key term to understand in relation to the 
UTACC system. Vulnerability is defined as a “weakness in an information system, 
system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited 
by a threat source” [15]. These flaws or weaknesses create gaps that can be exploited 
accidentally or intentionally by anyone who has access to the system. 
A vulnerability assessment of the UTACC system will be extremely difficult 
because the system has not yet been designed. The NIST SP 800–30 states that if the “IT 
system has not yet been designed, the search for vulnerabilities should focus on the 
organization’s security policies, planned security procedures, and system requirement 
definitions, and the vendors’ or developers’ security product analyses (e.g., white 
papers)” [31]. The security policies and planned security procedures of the Marine Corps, 
paired with an assessment of vulnerabilities in current IT and unmanned systems will be 
researched to provide a foundation for system designers and developers to consider. 
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6. Security Controls and Defense in Depth 
“Security controls” is another term that must be analyzed as it is a major element 
in the assessment of the UTACC system. Security controls are defined by NIST SP 800–
30 “as the safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information” [15].  
“Security controls encompass the use of both technical and nontechnical methods” [31]. 
These different methods will enable the UTACC system to effectively mitigate 
vulnerabilities that are either technical or nontechnical in nature.   
“Technical controls are safeguards that are incorporated into computer hardware, 
software, or firmware (e.g., access control mechanisms, identification and authentication 
mechanisms, encryption methods, intrusion detection software)” [31]. The UTACC 
system will have to employ technical security controls due to the highly technical nature 
of the system referenced in the Statement of Work (SOW) [28].  “Nontechnical controls 
are management and operational controls, such as security policies; operational 
procedures; and personnel, physical, and environmental security” [31]. These non-
technical controls will encompass all other controls required to ensure UTACC system 
integration through policies and procedures in the operational environment. 
Each of these methods (technical and non-technical) have sub-categories 
(preventative and detective) that must be explained to ensure the types of security 
controls being employed.  “Preventive controls inhibit attempts to violate security policy 
and include such controls as access control enforcement, encryption, and authentication” 
[15].  “Detective controls warn of violations or attempted violations of security policy 
and include such controls as audit trails, intrusion detection methods, and checksums” 
[15]. Security controls are a means to mitigate vulnerabilities to an acceptable level of 
risk, which allows for a person to assume responsibility for any information system, 
including UTACC 
A best common practice for achieving information assurance is the use of 
redundant security controls in a defensive plan. This practice is known as the Defense in 
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Depth concept [8]. The DOD definition explains how to achieve IA through defense in 
depth: 
The DOD approach for establishing an adequate IA posture in a shared-risk 
environment that allows for shared mitigation through: the integration of people, 
technology, and operations; the layering of IA solutions within and among IT 
assets; and, the selection of IA solutions based on their relative level of 
robustness. [10] 
 The mitigation techniques (protective mechanism) are layered throughout the entire 
threat surface area. This concept of layering (rings), redundancy, and separate lines of 
defense is visible in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.  Defense-in-Depth, from [23], depicts how gaps in certain lines of 
defense are supported by other forms of defense. 
 
As a demonstration system only, many of the concepts and principles above will 
not apply due to the system never being employed on a live DOD data network or on a 
battlefield. The next chapters apply the concepts above to a theoretical UTACC system 
that would be both connected to a DOD data network and employed on a battlefield 
alongside the Marines. 
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III. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
This chapter will explain the creation of the threat template which was designed 
to assess the UTACC system by identifying security shortfalls. Second, the chapter will 
explain each individual section of the threat template. This template will include all the 
elements from the Cyber Matrix, the threat selection process, system impacts, and the 
projected effectiveness of security controls. The use of this template will enable mission 
critical weaknesses to be discovered. The weaknesses will need to be addressed prior to 
UTACC system development. 
A. TEMPLATE CREATION 
Due to the plethora of threats the UTACC system will be exposed to, the authors 
decided to simplify the process of explaining and assessing each threat. To streamline the 
analysis, cover the maximum number of threats, and increase the utility of this thesis the 
threat template was created. This template allows for the individual assessment and 
understanding of specific threats that could impact the UTACC system, without 
confusing the reader in the process. Due to the diverse audience the authors attempt to 
bridge the language barrier between Marines and technical designers and developers. 
The authors included all the cyber security matrix elements in the threat template 
as a baseline to evaluate the UTACC system as an information system. Additionally, the 
authors added assumptions to assist system developers to understand the environment the 
UTACC system will operate within. System impacts were added to depict the gravity of 
each threat to the team and system if not mitigated. The impact of security controls 
relates the impacts of mitigation strategies to the design, fielding processes, and costs of 
the UTACC system.   
The NIST’s guide for conducting risk assessments served as an influence to the 
template creation process. Specifically, publication 800–30 shows a model (Figure 6) that 
assisted in the design of the threat template. Many of the concepts therein, such as 
likelihood of threat success, degrees of impact, and organizational and operational risk 
can be seen mirrored in the threat template designed for this thesis [15]. 
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Figure 6.  Generic Risk Model with Key Risk Factors, from [15], shows how 
risk is defined from a threat source. 
B. BREAKDOWN OF THREAT TEMPLATE  
The diversity of threats that exist against an information system requires a study 
of each piece of the vast threat surface area of the UTACC system. Figure 7 shows the 
template used to research each threat and the components of each threat. 
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Figure 7.  Threat template shows the sections included in the template used for 
each threat assessment. 
1. Threat Area 
The list of threats is selected from the threat areas of people, technology, and 
operations. Threats exist that span separate areas, and threats exist that are either 
technologically or operationally based, or both. The cyber matrix discussed in Chapter 
Two serves as a guideline for sorting through threats and deriving the area in which the 
threat exists. To classify each threat within a specific threat area questions regarding the 
threat’s target or specific vulnerability were asked. This can be separate from what is 
actually affected by the threat itself. For example a phishing attack is an attack against the 
threat area people, but the effects of the attack can be seen in technology and operations. 
Many threats exist within the scope of just one threat area, but some span two or more 
areas. An example of this is the ownership / maintenance of the UTACC system where 
the threat area spans both people and operations. 
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2. Threat Selection Process 
The threat list generated is in no way comprehensive, but allows for the research 
to delve into the range of both the simple and complex threats needed to aid in the design 
and development of the UTACC system. It would be impossible for this thesis to conduct 
an in-depth analysis of every threat that may exist against the UTACC system. The 
authors also attempted to get an even spread of threats affecting people, technology, and 
operations. The discussion will account for the reality that the UTACC system will be 
operated in a kinetic environment, which introduces some unique threats that must be 
thought through prior to system design. 
3. Threat Summary 
The threat summary section includes many parts and is the largest section of the 
template. This section serves as the core of the template, while at the same time fulfilling 
a flexible catchall function. The purpose of this section is to explain the threat itself in 
detail. Included are any relevant background information or history, the threat’s 
definition, and how the threat itself would apply to the UTACC system specifically. 
Information from the authors’ experiences throughout their time in the USMC is included 
if relevant to the information being presented. Lastly, both the most dangerous and most 
likely results of the threat are presented along with an example of each. These results 
explain the impact of the threat to the system, team, and the mission.  
4. Impact to the CIA Triad 
This section names the pillar or pillars of the CIA triad that are affected by this 
threat. The CIA triad, from Chapter Two, consists of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, each of which affects the UTACC system’s ability to operate very 
differently. The triad allows the research to assess each threat from the standpoint of how 
the information is affected by the threat. The access of information by unauthorized 
individuals compromises the confidentiality of the UTACC’s information. Modification 
or destruction of information compromises the integrity of UTACC’s information. 
Denying access to the information compromises the availability of UTACC’s 
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information. A threat may not necessarily target just one pillar of the triad, but can target 
two or all three in different or unique ways. 
5. Vulnerability Analysis 
To completely understand where in the UTACC’s life cycle a threat exists, the 
template includes a section on vulnerability analysis. This section identifies the point or 
period during which a vulnerability appears against the UTACC system. As each point of 
vulnerability is different, they may require unique security controls to be put in place at 
various times throughout the UTACC system’s development and operation. The threat 
arises during a specific point or period; however, security controls can be put in place at 
any time. The range of vulnerable times includes initial research and development, 
manufacturing, fielding/training, and finally during any operation or maintenance phase. 
6. Assumptions 
Certain assumptions were made throughout the threat selection and analysis 
process. These assumptions were made based on USMC doctrine, technology, the 
operating environment of the UTACC system, and the authors’ experiences. The 
assumptions based on doctrine are those that account for tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs), standard operating procedures (SOPs), the maintenance cycles, and 
staff planner’s timelines. Assumptions on technology include those regarding the current 
state of technology as well as the future technology that may exist at the time of UTACC 
fielding and operation. Assumptions on the operating environment of UTACC include 
enemy capabilities ranging from those encountered in our recent campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to enemy capabilities of near-peer countries as well as factors such as 
weather and terrain. The assumptions based on the authors’ experiences in the Fleet 
Marine Forces are those that account for the nature of Marines and unit commanders and 
the value that both mission accomplishment and the lives of Marines play in an operation. 
7. Security Controls 
Security controls are safeguards implemented to mitigate specific vulnerabilities. 
These security controls are recommended after analyzing where the UTACC system is 
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vulnerable to each threat. Security controls include technical and non-technical controls. 
Technical controls include system specific modifications or capabilities. Non-technical 
controls include training for operators, maintainers, and planners; operational and 




The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, a section is included which further 
classifies each threat into threat types beyond the broad areas of people, technology, and 
operations. This classification is designed to assist the reader in navigating through the 
appendices. Second, this chapter will explain one threat using the template presented in 
Chapter 3. The discussion of how the template was used to frame this threat will enable 
the reader to easily process the additional 28 threats to the UTACC system.   
A. THREAT TYPE CLASSIFICATION 
All twenty-nine threats are provided in the appendices. These templates are 
designed to be both an integral part of the thesis as well as stand-alone documents. 
Because of this, the reader will encounter repetition of often repeated security controls.   
For organizational purposes the threat templates were organized by the threat areas of 
people, technology, and operations. 
The threats analyzed within the people threat area include Insider Threat and 
Phishing which are grouped together because they deal with a rogue actor. Ownership 
and Maintenance of UTACC, Attitude Towards Emerging Technologies and Equipment, 
and Autonomy as an Ethical Concern are the remaining people threats which are grouped 
together because they deal with people that do not necessarily have a malicious intent. 
The threats analyzed within the technology threat area are broken down further 
into (1) Threats with a malicious actor, (2) Threats that arise within the UTACC’s 
operational organization, and (3) The technology of UTACC itself. Threats with a 
malicious actor include Spyware, Jamming of C2 and Data Links, Denial of Service 
Attack, Eavesdropping, An Attack on Mobile Devices on a Wireless Network, A 
Computer Virus Targeting the UTACC system, Impersonation or Spoofing of a UGV or a 
UAV, and Spoofing an IP or MAC Address of a UTACC System Component. The threats 
that arise from within the UTACC’s operational organization include Unprotected 
Information Stored on the UTACC System, Frequency Management and De-confliction, 
and UTACC System Integration with Legacy and Newly Procured Systems. The last 
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threat area applies directly to the technology of UTACC and includes Autonomous 
Software, Unencrypted C2 and Data Links, and Controlled Cryptographic Item 
Employment Onboard an Autonomous System. 
The threats analyzed within the operations threat area include threats to the design 
and integration of the UTACC system and threats against the employment of UTACC. 
Threats to the design and integration of UTACC include Cost Threat to UTACC System 
Research, Development, and Testing; Airspace Integration; Surface Space Integration of 
UTACC; and Human Machine Interaction. Threats against the employment of UTACC 
include Reconnaissance Team Employment of UTACC, Survivability of the UTACC 
System from Enemy Weaponry, Environmental Threats, Terrain, Shipboard Operations, 
and Operational Endurance. 
B. AIRSPACE INTEGRATION 
The authors chose the threat of Air Space Integration (Appendix U). Airspace 
Integration was chosen to illustrate the dynamics of not only viewing the UTACC system 
as an information system, but also as an asset within the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). As such, the example threat serves as a bridge between a typical information 
system and the unique capabilities of the UTACC system. 
1. Threat Area / Threat 
As outlined in the Statement of Work, “UTACC shall consist of both a ground 
component(s) and an aerial component(s) acting in a collaborative fashion as a single 
system with a single operator” [28]. This threat exists in the operational threat area 
because it has the potential to affect UTACC system operations. This threat affects the 
airspace system and all actions that take place in this domain. The introduction of a semi-
autonomous aerial vehicle into the airspace system increases the risk to military 





Figure 8.  Threat Area / Threat depicts the categories this into which this threat 
template falls. 
2. Threat Summary 
The threat summary (Figure 9) for the Airspace Integration threat links the current 
operational environment with the specific threat to the UTACC system. Due to the 
specification of Airspace Integration this section includes relevant recent history within 
DOD, current USMC employment of similar systems, where UTACC fits in this threat 
environment, and the most dangerous and most likely outcomes of this threat. The 
flexibility of this section allows for threat-specific information such as experience, 




Figure 9.  Threat Summary describes the pertinent information for the threat of 
Airspace Integration. 
3. Impact to the CIA Triad 
Of the three pillars of the CIA Triad (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) 
only availability was impacted by the threat of Airspace Integration. Availability in this 
context is referring to the accessibility of the UTACC system to be utilized during an 
operation. Availability was deemed to be at risk because of safety of flight concerns for 
 35 
the UTACC system if the security controls are not met. This would result in the UAV 
being grounded due to inadequate integration.  This is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Impact to the CIA Triad names the area of the CIA triad that is 
impacted by the threat. 
4. Vulnerability Analysis 
The threat of Airspace Integration arises at the point when the UAV portion of the 
UTACC system enters the airspace system and lasts for the duration of the UAV flight, as 
seen in Figure 11. This point is when the specific threat has the potential to negatively 
impact the UTACC system or the UTACC’s mission.  
 
Figure 11.  Vulnerability Analysis defines the point at which the threat arises 
against the UTACC system. 
5. Assumptions 
The assumptions in this threat template are provided to limit the scope of the 
threat analysis in the template. The assumptions for Airspace Integration focuses the 
reader on the importance of rules and regulations within airspace integration.  These 




Figure 12.  Assumptions lists the relevant assumptions for this threat. 
6. Security Controls 
The non-technical security controls were chosen to ensure system designers and 
decision makers understand two key things not related to the physical aspect of the 
system. First, they must understand the importance of the governing regulations of the 
airspace system which enable proper integration of the UTACC system in this domain. 
Secondly, they must understand the importance of training and coordination prior to the 
utilization of the UTACC system within the airspace system. 
The technical security controls were chosen to ensure safety of flight through 
technological components. These controls can set limits to the autonomy or apply 
technical controls within the UTACC system during its operations within the airspace 
system. Technical security controls ensure the UTACC system has the capabilities it 
needs to integrate into the airspace system.  Both types (non-technical and technical) of 
security controls can be seen in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Security Controls lists the non-technical and technical security 
controls recommended for this threat. 
  
FAA, DoD, and USMC 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the findings resulting from Chapter 4 and Appendices A-CC 
analysis. Prior to conducting analysis, the authors anticipated certain categories and 
patterns to arise from threats and vulnerabilities. After the research was conducted other 
patterns emerged that are of significant value to the ongoing analysis of information 
systems. Those patterns of threats and vulnerabilities found in each threat template are 
highlighted here. Additionally, the authors focus on the themes most commonly 
occurring within the security control recommendations and identify which mitigation 
strategies will be of the utmost importance to the development of the UTACC system. 
The UTACC system is an advanced autonomous concept aimed at both 
information collaboration on the battlefield and at unmanned operations. However, this 
UTACC concept will never be a solution leveraged by the USMC without prior 
consideration of security and mitigation strategies, which may be applied to its inherent 
vulnerabilities. Creating the threat template has allowed the analysis of threats and their 
specific vulnerabilities. By incorporating security measures early in the design process, 
these threat mitigation features are integrated into the UTACC technology early on 
proactively. The result of not doing this early is a security policy based on reaction to 
threats, which means the information system is left vulnerable. 
The following are answers discovered in response to the original research 
questions. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT THREATS EXIST THAT HAVE THE 
POTENTIAL TO AFFECT THE UTACC? 
There are many threats that exist against the UTACC system that can affect the 
system in many ways. They exist within the threat areas of people, technology, and 
operations. Some of these threats exist against the support structures for the UTACC 
system regardless of system implementation. As UTACC is not yet fully operational and 
not expected to be within the next 10–15 years, it is not possible to anticipate every threat 
that will exist against the system. Additional analysis is sure to find more threats as the 
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system matures. The existence of these threats shows the vast “surface area” for the 
UTACC system and proves the need to assess the vulnerabilities and apply security 
controls. Once UTACC is fully operational, further analysis will be required to uncover 
other threats. Indeed, one concept of the emerging NIST Risk Management Framework 
approach is to provide continuous monitoring and updating on new threats and 
implementing associated controls.   
During the initial analysis of threats the authors saw the anticipated patterns of the 
people, technology, and operations threat areas. After additional research unanticipated 
patterns emerged. These patterns show threats existing with and without malicious actors, 
arising within the UTACC’s operational organizations, including the technology of 
UTACC itself, existing against the design and integration of the UTACC system, and 
arising against the employment of UTACC. These new patterns, seen throughout the 29 
threats, proved to be a valuable way to organize and view the threats. The addition of 
those threat areas to this thesis refines the broad area of threat into manageable “threat 
lanes” aimed specifically at the UTACC system. Those “threat lanes” will assist with the 
identification of additional threats to the UTACC system when the topic is researched 
further. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 2: WHAT VULNERABILITIES ARE 
INHERENT IN THE UTACC CONCEPT? 
There are many vulnerabilities within the UTACC system concept and expected 
employment strategy. These vulnerabilities exist within the system itself and the 
environment in which the system will be employed. They also exist within the employing 
agency, which in this case is the USMC. These patterns of vulnerability to the UTACC 
system were used by the authors as anticipated outcomes prior to analysis. 
After conducting our analysis of vulnerabilities two distinct patterns with which 
to characterize vulnerabilities emerged. The first pattern categorizes vulnerabilities by the 
presence or absence of a malicious actor. In this pattern a malicious actor can be a kinetic 
(physical) or cyber (network) threat. Surprisingly, the UTACC system is vulnerable to 14 
of the 29 threats without the presence of a malicious actor or enemy. This means the risk 
 41 
exists within the employing organization, in the operating environment, or rests solely in 
the technology of UTACC. This pattern balances the threat analysis out as the remaining 
15 threats do include the presence of a malicious actor. 
The second pattern that emerged categorizes vulnerabilities by the point or points 
in the life cycle when threats emerge. As some of the threats are complex this analysis 
can show vulnerabilities emerging in multiple points of the life cycle. The UTACC 
system is most vulnerable to threats during system employment and during design or 
development. The UTACC system is less vulnerable to threats during fielding, 
demonstration, and training. This pattern will be key in determining when security 
controls are required for the UTACC system, and could also aid in further research in the 
area. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 3: WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MITIGATE 
THOSE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES WITHIN UTACC?  
For each of the 29 threat templates security controls are recommended as a 
starting point for the mitigation of each threat. These are sorted into non-technical and 
technical controls. These security controls are not exhaustive, and do not consider the 
mitigation strategies at the component level specific to UTACC because the authors 
expect technology to change before system design and development. 
Many reoccurring security controls can be seen in the templates in both the 
technical and non-technical areas. Within the non-technical category the following 
security controls emerged as those essential to threat mitigation. 
• Policies, procedures and publications must be analyzed to determine specific 
UTACC system requirements. Requirements lead to the development of 
system specifications which will drive operational employment, training, and 
integration of the system. 
• The UTACC system security policies and procedures must be developed to 
meet the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
• Adherence to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emission 
security.   
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• Training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the UTACC 
system employment by a USMC unit.  
• Extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.    
Technical security control reoccurrences do not form as much of a visible pattern 
in the research due to the specificity of the technical security controls to the individual 
threats. The one security control that stands out however is the recommendation for the 
UTACC system to incorporate semi-autonomous modes of operation. This security 
control is mentioned in 27 of the 29 templates. Other technical security controls that 
emerged as those necessary to mitigate threats are listed below. 
• Remote zeroing of software, data, and cryptographic material. 
• Employ tamper resistant technology.  
• Independent UGV and UAV operations. 
• Redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the EM spectrum. 
• Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANS)). 
Those security controls included above stand out as being highly important to the 
UTACC system employment and must be incorporated into the design and development 
of UTACC to ensure success.   
D. FUTURE WORK 
Before the full employment of this type of autonomous system additional research 
that goes beyond what this thesis provides must be conducted. Continuous monitoring 
and analysis of newly emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and their related security controls 
are still required. New and emerging threats due to changing technologies may also make 
the security controls recommended in this thesis irrelevant. As a demonstration system 
UTACC is not required to go through DIACAP, but other related systems that will 
operate on the DOD networks will require that level of analysis. We recommend any 
similar system to go through a similar threat and vulnerability assessment before and 
after initial security controls are added. 
UTACC system research is not finished. More research is required to completely 
analyze the plethora of threats that could not be covered in this thesis. Additionally, the 
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patterns of security controls emerging from this thesis require additional scrutiny. In 
some cases possible changes to the organizational and cultural behavior must occur prior 
to procuring and employing an autonomous system like UTACC. Though it is impossible 
to find every vulnerability, thinking about security at every stage of the design and 
development process will enable system designers to minimize those inherent risks. 
As UTACC is not yet fully operational, it was not possible to discover and 
analyze every part of UTACC to find vulnerabilities. Once UTACC is fully operational, 
further testing will be required to uncover other vulnerabilities in the system. For this the 
authors recommend the further use of the threat template created during this research 
project. It has proven to provide utility to the analysis of the UTACC system and may 
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APPENDIX A. INSIDER THREAT 







An insider threat includes but is not limited to bugs, wiretaps, recording, and shoulder 
surfing (looking over a co-workers shoulder while they are working on a computer) [32]. These 
threats are prevalent in any information or unmanned system because people will inevitably 
operate, maintain, and manipulate the system. The federal government and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) have been targeted by insider threats since the founding of the country [33]. 
An insider threat is essentially espionage with the intent to steal, alter, destroy or degrade 
information or information systems. An insider threat is serious with regards to the damage a 
potential user can have on a system, organization, and people [34]. An insider threat affects all 
three attributes of the CIA triad making it a dangerous threat.   
The most dangerous threat possibility would be an insider manipulating the software or 
the system to affect the mission outcome or to endanger personnel. An example would be a 
team member with access to the UTACC system modifying the specific mission software and 
causing the system to attack itself or the team. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) could be 
programed to crash into team members or into the ground vehicle. The Unmanned Ground 
Vehicle (UGV) could be programmed to run over team members.   
The most likely threat impact would be a team member or contractor has access to the 
system and steals information, software, or mission data with the intent to distribute the stolen 
information to a foreign government or enemy.    
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
•  An insider threat directly impacts confidentiality, but combined with other threats 
could impact data integrity and availability [32]. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and employment 
stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best common 
practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to the standards 
of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless man-
in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
 46 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data sharing. 
• Insider threats are already prevalent in every information and unmanned systems in the 
DOD and this threat has been mitigated to an acceptable level of risk through our 
current policies, education and training.   
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. Requirements 
lead to the development of system specifications which will drive operational 
employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-cycle. 
Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet the 
requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system completes the 
DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and policies 
which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the 
UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Assess and mitigate Insider Threats through training requirements prescribed by 
the DOD and the USMC.    
o Research approaches used by other weapons and information systems. 
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of operation, 
with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they have employed 
in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key pairs 
(public and private) and only the private key must be kept secret [35]. 
Public key cryptology is expensive and requires significant 
infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact that 
the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors and 
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tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and cryptographic 
material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the USMC 
communication architecture through best practices (boundary, firewall, router 
access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANS)). 
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APPENDIX B. PHISHING 
THREAT AREA (PEOPLE, 
TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONS) 





Phishing is an attempt to gain sensitive information such as usernames and passwords 
from an individual by impersonating a legitimate entity. In many cases this takes place in an 
email that is impersonating a legitimate entity, asking the target individual to verify information 
(banking numbers, SSN, etc) [37]. In the case of UTACC the attack would specifically target 
personnel that maintain, operate or have direct contact with the UTACC system in order to 
expose vital access data for the system. This data could include administrative user names, 
passwords, and personal identification numbers (PIN).  
The most dangerous threat permutation would be an attacker gaining access to 
information enabling them to control the UTACC system, destroy it, and / or steal sensitive 
information. An example of this would an email that appears to be from a system manufacturer 
(General Dynamics or Lockheed Martin) stating that there is a problem with the UTACC 
system that can be fixed remotely as long as the usernames and passwords are included in a 
reply email. If a reply email is sent the unauthorized user acquires access to the entire UTACC 
system. 
The most likely threat impact would be an attacker gaining access information, using the 
same method stated above, enabling temporary access to change settings or parameters that in 
turn would reduce the UTACC’s mission capability and effectiveness. 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• Phishing is a direct threat to confidentiality, but could also impact integrity and 
availability [32]. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and employment 
stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best common 
practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to the standards 
of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless man-
in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
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• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data sharing. 
• Phishing threats are already prevalent in every information and unmanned systems in the 
DOD and this threat has been mitigated to an acceptable level of risk through current 
policies, best common practices, education and training.   
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. Requirements 
lead to the development of system specifications which will drive operational 
employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-cycle. 
Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet the 
requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system completes the 
DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and policies 
which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the 
UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Assess and mitigate Phishing threats through training requirements prescribed by 
the DOD and the USMC.    
• Technical Controls  
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of operation, 
with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they have employed 
in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key pairs 
(public and private) and only the private key must be kept secret [35]. 
Public key cryptology is expensive and requires significant infrastructure 
[36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact that the 
same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key distribution 
issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors and 
tampering. 
o Employ and research tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and cryptographic 
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material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the USMC 
communication architecture through best practices (boundary, firewall, router 
access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANS)). 
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APPENDIX C. MAINTENANCE OF THE UTACC SYSTEM 
THREAT AREA (PEOPLE, TECHNOLOGY, 
OPERATIONS) 
People / Operations 
THREAT 
 
Maintenance of the UTACC System 
THREAT SUMMARY 
This threat stands against the ability of a unit to own and maintain the UTACC system. Without 
proper maintenance and accountability the UTACC system will rarely, if ever, be 100% mission ready. 
The maintenance process needs to be extensively researched before acquiring and distributing the 
UTACC system to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). This system is extremely unique because it is 
composed of parts and components that traditionally are owned by multiple agencies within the Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This could result in multiple supply chains, which confuse and slow 
maintenance processes. A look at current maintenance procedures of current Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) employed by the Marine Corps will offer maintenance options for the UTACC system.   
The examples provided offer two distinct methods of maintaining an unmanned system, like 
UTACC. An example of split maintenance /and supply chains is seen currently in the USMC with the 
Shadow UAS. The Air Combat Element (ACE) provides aviation supply support to Marine Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU) aviation assets, such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and the 
Ground Control Stations (GCS) [38]. The VMU squadron’s non-aviation assets (radios, vehicles, 
generators) are provided through the existing Marine Corps system for provisioning and supplies [38]. 
This is a cause for consternation and confusion in current VMUs. In contrast, the Raven UAS is owned, 
operated, and maintained by Marine infantry battalions [38].   The responsibility of one entity for this 
technology streamlines the maintenance process to a single system. This streamlined maintenance 
process would be the simplest way to integrate the UTACC system into MAGTF operations from a 
maintenance standpoint.   
An infantry or reconnaissance battalion possesses enough organic support to maintain a system, 
like UTACC. These units have the following organic assets available (Intelligence, Communications 
(EKMS), Ground / Air Operation planners, Logistics (Maintenance), and Supply) to assist in planning, 
operations, and maintenance of the system. Operationally the UTACC system is being designed to 
support small teams or squads who will employ and operate the system, which will be supported through 
infantry or reconnaissance battalions.   
The most dangerous threat impact to the UTACC’s maintenace readiness is the potential for the 
system to be fieided without a plan to train Marines on the UTACC system maintenance procedures.   In 
this example the UTACC system is delivered to an operational unit and none of the Marines have 
completed the required maintenance training. The UTACC system in inoperable and must be inducted 
into the maintenance cycle, but the unit does not possess qualified maintainers to repair the system.    
The most likely threat possibility is that replacement parts and components are not readily 
available in the supply system when UTACC is delivered for operational employment. An example 
would be that a UTACC system component fails during operations and the Marines must wait an 
extended period to receive a replacement component. The result is a non-mission capable system until 
the part is received, installed, and tested. 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• Improper maintenance could lead to a system crash, which is a threat to data availability 
[32].  
 54 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• When the UTACC system is fielded to operational units. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best common practices to 
enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to the standards of an operational 
team member. 
• The UTACC system will be supported through a Marine Corps or Navy supply system.  
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and publications to 
determine specific UTACC system requirements. Requirements lead to the development 
of system specifications which will drive operational employment, training, and 
integration of the system. 
o Establish a training pipeline for maintenance that will support the UTACC system 
employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Develop a detailed maintenance plan that is vetted by an operational FMF unit owns the 
UTACC system. 
o Conduct a detailed review of the RQ-7B Shadow, RQ-11 STUAS, and RQ-11 Raven 
UASs programs and their approach to maintenance and ownership of the systems.  
o Research the utilization of three-dimensional printing solutions to provide replacement 
parts for UTACC. 
o Research and implement simple user maintenance techniques. 
• Technical Controls 




APPENDIX D. ATTITUDE TOWARDS EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 





Attitude Towards Emerging Technologies 
THREAT SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps does not readily accept anything new unless it is a proven asset and provides 
an exceptional capability. The USMC has always made do, and accomplished their mission, with less 
equipment, technology, money, and people. The Marine Corps does not normally lead in developing 
advanced technology for combat operations. Technological advancements take time to mature to a level 
of reliability for utilization in combat. An example of a technological advancement reaching maturity 
would be the Advanced Research Project Agency Network (ARPANET). The ARPANET was the first 
computer network and was developed in the 1960s [39]. The ARPANET took roughly forty years to 
mature into the networks that are currently employed in support of combat operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Marines are now comfortable with utilizing computer networks in combat operations and the 
UTACC system must reach the same level of reliability to be relevant to the Marine Corps.   
The authors have observed that when new technologies are fielded to the USMC, the initial 
perception of Marines receiving the technology is that it will be an additional burden to the unit 
especially with regards to maintenance, accountability, and operational capability. If fielded improperly 
without proven operational capabilities, extensive training packages, and a solid maintenance plan the 
UTACC system will be quickly discarded to sit on a shelf. When lives hang in the balance Marines will 
trust technology they understand and can physically see as a combat multiplier. An autonomous robot on 
the battlefield will initially be seen as a threat to mission success and the lives of Marines. Another issue 
affecting the credibility of UTACC is the unproven autonomous and user interface technology required 
by the system.   
             The user interface technology, which is entirely new and requires the development of a new 
concept of operations to integrate this technology into a Marine Corps unit. This newly developed 
Human Marine Interaction (HMI) software must earn the trust of Marines before it will ever be 
employed. The final configuration of UTACC is intended to be a decision-centric, semi-autonomous, 
distributive, multi-agent, and multi-domain robotic system [28]. UTACC will require HMI between 
Marines and all system components. The interaction required for UTACC to provide capabilities would 
be the same interaction required between team members. Robots have not been able to demonstrate the 
abilities of a teammate and therefore would not be employed by a small unit in combat because it is not 
a proven technology [40]. UTACC technology must be heavily researched, developed, and tested to 
meet the unique and rigorous demands of a reconnaissance team.     
The most dangerous impact of this threat to the UTACC system would be the procurement and 
failure to utilize the system, due to the lack of confidence in new equipment and technologies. The 
Marine Corps will not procure or utilize the UTACC system if the system does not produce a consistent 
and reliable set of capabilities.   
The most likely variation of this threat is that the system will be underutilized. An example of 
this would be the UTACC never being fully integrated into the commander’s Command and Control 
(C2) process as a result of increased equipment maintanance due to training shortfalls. 
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IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD  
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the Marine Corps culture toward emerging technology is not 
swayed the system will not be procured by the USMC. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• During demonstrations of UTACC that showcase capabilities for potential units. 
• Integration of the UTACC system during training exercises. 
• Insufficient training pipelines for the UTACC system.    
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• If this plan is not vetted by an operational unit with a vested interest, this concept will not be 
fully researched or developed. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and publications must 
to determine specific UTACC system requirements. Requirements lead to the 
development of system specifications which will drive operational employment, 
training, and integration of the system      
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet the 
requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system completes the 
DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD requirements for IA.   
o Educate leaders and key decision makers on the UTACC system technology and 
capabilities.  
o Demonstrate the capabilities of the UTACC to Fleet Marine Force personnel and 
commands. 
 The UTACC system must validate reliability while highlighting capabilities 
during demonstrations. Results and conclusions of these demonstrations, plus 
theses, point papers and briefs should be published by the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab to operational units.  
o Research the ability to incorporate current operational or program of record unmanned 
systems into the UTACC system. Marines have familiarity with these systems.    
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the UTACC 
system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.    
o Develop the UTACC system ensuring ease of use for Marines. 
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, with which Marine Corps 
personnel are familiar and which they have employed in combat operations.   
  
 57 
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Autonomy as an Ethical Concern 
THREAT SUMMARY 
Autonomy is a capability or a set of capabilities that allows certain actions of a system 
to be automatic while remaining inside the boundaries of a program.   At the most basic level, 
autonomy requires trust. We trust autonomous systems to route emails and assign Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses. Autonomy is even trusted in the Shadow UAS tactical automated 
landing system (TALS), which automatically lands the UAV without human interaction [38]. 
The level of autonomy illustrated in these examples are minor compared to the level of 
autonomy planned for the UTACC system. The amount of trust the UTACC requires to operate 
effectively is equal to the trust between Marines. The trust amongst Marines is developed over 
time due to training and familiarity with one another. Extensive training packages would be the 
format for introducing UTACC and over time the Marines would gain trust in the system.   
Semi-autonomous operations have a human in the loop, while full autonomy is the 
completion of a task or mission without human involvement other than mission assignment 
[41]. The threat of ethical considerations arises when we take a human out of the loop and 
allow technology to make its own decisions in a combat environment. This environment 
includes friendly forces, enemy forces, and civilian non-combatants. The technology by itself 
must be programmed to deal with different groups of people and could include interaction, 
avoidance, confrontation, etc. Programming cannot anticipate every situation the UTACC 
system will encounter. Accidents are expected to occur given the technical limitations of 
programming a robot with the ability to effectively distinguish valid and invalid targets, which 
raises the question of legal responsibility [42]. If a weapons system is added to the UTACC 
system, then an additional layer of ethical concern is added to the equation. 
The most dangerous variation of this threat would be the UTACC system being 
employed and becomming a physical threat to personnel (friendly/non-combatant). An 
example of this would be the UTACC Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) being surrounded by 
a group of civilians and the UGV being unable to move away from the crowd. The UGV might 
choose to move away from the crowd using the least blocked path which includes running over 
a small child as the child is caluclated to be the smallest obstacle. 
The most likely threat possibility is that the system will be underutilized for fear of a 
physical threat to personnel. An example of this would be never using the UTACC system in 
an urban environment where it will encouner civilian popluations, due to fear of the system 
harming innocent civilians. 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• If ethical concerns arise concerning the employment of the UTACC system it will be 
impact the availability of the system.  
•  
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IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• When the UTACC system is employed in any environment. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• If this plan is not vetted by an operational unit with a vested interest, this concept will 
not be fully researched or developed. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications must to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will drive 
operational employment, training, and integration of the system      
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet the 
requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system completes the 
DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD requirements for IA.   
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-cycle. 
Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the 
UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Conduct a detailed review of the RQ-7B Shadow, RQ-11 STUAS, and RQ-11 
Raven UASs programs and their approach to fully autonomous modes of 
operation.  
o Enlist NPS and Federally Funded Research Development Centers (FFRDC) to 
conduct research on the ethics of autonomous unmanned operations.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, with which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar and which they have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
 59 
APPENDIX F. SPYWARE 







Spyware is software that monitors and gathers data about an organization, 
individual, or entity without their knowledge and enables a third party to access the data 
[43]. The UTACC system will be vulnerable to spyware and if infected, the system will 
release sensitive data (telemetry data, map data, metadata) to our enemies without our 
knowledge. Spyware is a very serious problem and has caused more than 50 percent of 
the failures of the Microsoft Windows operating system [43]. The UTACC system will 
require some form of an operating system to enable Marine interaction. Application-
based spyware can open a channel to install upgrades and additional applications without 
user permission or knowledge [43]. All new mobile devices are application based and 
UTACC will have applications for end users, making it susceptible to this type of 
spyware.   
Spyware has adapted to the mobile world and will eventually target vehicles once 
they are integrated into the Internet [44]. Vehicles connected through networking are the 
basis for the UTACC system operation and collaboration. Vehicle Area Networks 
(VANET) require constant interaction with onboard sensors and spyware might track 
vehicles by conducting passive sensor-based attacks [44].  
The most dangerous threat impact of spyware to UTACC would be an enemy 
gaining the ability locate our friendly forces due to infiltration into the UTACC system. 
For instance the enemy could develop spyware to acquire telemetry data from the 
UTACC. This data might help the enemy to locate the UTACC system and the Marines 
employing the system. 
The most likely possible threat of spyware would be application-based spyware 
installing updates and modifications to the UTACC system without the knowledge of the 
Marines. The system would eventually experience a failure with the operating system, 
making the system non-mission capable.   
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the UTACC system.        
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Research approaches used by other weapons and information systems. 
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
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 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
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APPENDIX G. JAMMING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND 
DATA LINKS 
THREAT AREA (PEOPLE, 
TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONS) 




Jamming of Command and Control and 
Data Links  
THREAT SUMMARY 
  Electronic attack is the division of electronic warfare involving the use of 
electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack equipment 
(UTACC) [45]. The UTACC system must be functional in an environment where our 
enemy can jam our command and control and information communication links. A near 
peer enemy will have jammers that can affect the entire frequency spectrum.   
A focus of UTACC system developers and designers should be electronic 
protection that focuses on passive and active means to protect equipment from friendly or 
enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrades, neutralizes, or destroys friendly 
combat capability [45]. The UTACC will be exposed to electronic attack and the 
common threat of jamming communication links must be addressed and mitigated. When 
a transmitter-receiver pair communicates, a jammer can corrupt the data and make it 
unreadable at the receiver side [46].  
The most dangerous threat possibility during an electronic attack would be the 
UTACC system being targeted by enough directed energy to cause electronic component 
failure while in operation. The Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) is discovered by 
enemy ground forces and a directed energy device is directed at the UGV and all the 
onboard electronic systems are damaged. If the UGV is required for Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) operations and information exchange, the UAV will be rendered 
ineffective.     
The most likely threat impact would be the enemy electronically jamming a 
certain band of the frequency spectrum, rendering it unusable for a certain amount of 
time. For example, the enemy could jam a portion of the C-Band frequency spectrum, 
rendering the video feeds in that portion of the spectrum useless.   
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• The UTACC system is required to utilize portions of the frequency spectrum to 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Research approaches used by other weapons and information systems. 
o Conduct extensive research of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum; 
identify frequency bandwidth requirements of the system, identify 
portions of the EM spectrum available for use, identify enough EM 
spectrum to facilitate frequency hopping to mitigate jamming. 
o Coordinate with USMC and DOD frequency management officials to 
ensure frequency availability. 
o Research the utilization of cognitive radios that seek open spectrum and 
ensure they are in compliance with USMC COMSEC procedures and the 
USMC and DOD frequency management policies.   
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
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o Employ a fully autonomous get home control mode of operation (Shadow 
UAS). 
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations to mitigate the effects 
if one portion of the UTACC system is jammed.  
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APPENDIX H. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK 





Denial of Service Attack 
THREAT SUMMARY 
A denial of service attack incapacitates networks through saturation and 
bandwidth consumption (i.e sendmail buffer overflow, pipe attacks, MIMEbo, Syn flood) 
[32]. This attack can be used against a system like UTACC to render the system 
inoperable. The denial of service threat against the UTACC system could utilize an 
internal routing protocol between the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/Unmanned 
Ground Vehicle (UGV) or any router or routing protocol between any components of the 
UTACC system. The denial of service attack would render the internal routers of the 
system useless, therefore causing the system not to process or route data to key 
components of the UTACC system and to decision makers.   
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the enemy discovering  a 
vulnerability in the routing protocols within the UTACC system. The unauthorized user 
then could develop a denial of service attack to specifically target the UTACC system 
routing protocols, rendering the system fully inoperable. This attack vector, once 
discovered could be employed against every UTACC system until a security patch is 
installed. For example if the UTACC system is on an operational network and the 
systems’ routing protocols are specifically targeted by hackers this could cause the 
systems to become inoperable.       
The most likely threat impact would be periods of non-operability while patches 
are installed   for  denial of service attacks on popular routing protocols used by many 
systems, including UTACC. A security patch for the denial of service attack would likely 
be developed prior to the UTACC systems being affected. An example would be that an 
attacker would attack a certain vulnerability in a popular wireless routing protocol 
utilized by many systems. While the security patch is being develped, distributed, and 
installed the UTACC system would be non-operational.    
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This attack can impact availability and integrity of resources and data [32]. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
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significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc). 
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
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APPENDIX I. EAVESDROPPING 







Eavesdropping occurs when a transmitter sends data to a receiver and the data is 
received by anyone other than the intended recipient; eavesdropping is almost impossible 
to detect [46]. Eavesdropping can occur on wired and wireless communications links. 
The UTACC system will employ wireless Command and Control (C2) and data links, 
enabling the eavesdropping threat. Eavesdropping is conducted in myriad ways including 
electronic bugs, applications such as Trojan horses, packet sniffers, and amplifiers on 
unprotected cables [32].   In the case of UTACC, eavesdropping could take place when 
the data is being passed from the UTACC system to the Marines or between the UTACC 
system components. Current Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) do not 
properly mitigate this threat because their C2 and data links are not currently encrypted 
[38]. The UTACC system must mitigate this threat to an acceptable level because 
eavesdropping can lead to more serious threats. An example of more serious attacks 
include viruses or malicious code that may compromise a wireless device and 
subsequently impact a wired network [47].   
The most dangerous situation would be an attacker eavesdropping on the UTACC 
system and being able to discern critical information about the system, like Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses. The attacker then could masquerade the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address and gain access to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). The 
attacker could then employ a virus to attack the SIPRNET by gaining access through the 
UTACC system.  
The most likely threat impact would be an attacker eavesdropping on a certain 
frequency and being able to hear or see noise, but is unable to distinguish the data or 
information on the frequency.   
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• Eavesdropping impacts data confidentiality; but when combined with other 
threats could impact data integrity and availability [32]. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data 
sharing. 
• Eavesdropping will happen regardless and this threat must be mitigated. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
  
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
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 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc). 
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
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An Attack on Mobile Devices on a Wireless 
Network  
THREAT SUMMARY 
This threat is aimed at the mobile devices a UTACC system will use to store, 
transmit, and receive sensitive data to allow for UTACC operations. To analyze this 
threat, this template will compare these components of the UTACC system to common 
mobile devices (smart phones, tablets, laptop computers), since significant research has 
been conducted on these devices. Mobile devices offer a significant area of vulnerability 
to UTACC. Mobile devices are small and portable which make them easily obtainable 
through theft or misplacement by the owner, enabling the discovery of sensitive data 
stored on the device [47].   
The data that will be stored on the UTACC system mobile components will 
require sophisticated protection schemas to ensure the data is not compromised. If a 
mobile device is stolen or lost and still has network connectivity the entire network is 
now exponentially more vulnerable to exploitation. Viruses or malicious code may 
compromise a wireless device and successively impact the wired network [47]. Once the 
enemy or attacker has possession and access to mobile device, they are able to access the 
network and affect more than the data on the device.   
The most dangerous threat scenario would be the enemy gaining access to the 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) through a lost or stolen mobile 
device associated with the UTACC system which has retained network connectivity. An 
example would be a Marine losing a UTACC mobile device. The enemy is able to 
acquire and gain access to the lost mobile device and the network and upload a virus 
causing a network outage.   
The most likely threat impact would be that a lost mobile device is obtained by 
our enemy who is able to gain access to the classified information stored on the mobile 
device. The enemy or attacker is able to crack the encryption schema device, unlocking 
all the information on the device. The device no longer has network connectivity because 
it was reported lost and blacklisted from the network. The enemy now has potentially 
valuable information that was stored on the mobile device.     
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 




IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data 
sharing. 
• Marines will utilize mobile devices to employ the UTACC system. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
  
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
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o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
o Implement separate boot files for specific missions to decrease data stored 
on the UTACC system. 
o Research and consider organic local data processing and deletion techniques 
to minimize data storage onboard UTACC. 
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Computer Virus Attack on the UTACC 
System  
THREAT SUMMARY 
Computer viruses have developed over time from programs such as Trojan horses 
and logic bombs [48]. A computer virus infects software programs in order to alter, erase, 
destroy, or reveal critical information to benefit the attacker [48]. Computer viruses can 
be developed to target a wide range of software programs or can be specifically 
developed to exploit a specific software. The Stuxnet virus was designed to specifically 
target Siemens industrial control systems, which were employed by Iranian nuclear 
reactors [49].   
Our enemies have multiple methods to employ viruses against UTACC. The first 
method is enabled through geographical co-location between the enemy and Unmanned 
Ground Vehicle (UGV). The enemy is able to upload the virus through a physical 
connection to the UGV. Viruses or malicious code may compromise a wireless device 
and subsequently impact a wired network [47]. The second method would be accessing 
the UTACC system virtually through wired and wireless networks.   
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the enemy constructing a 
computer virus specifically designed to attack the UTACC system. An example would be 
that the UGV is located by the enemy and a computer virus is uploaded into the UGV. 
The virus replicates to other UTACC systems being employed through network 
connectivity and all become infected with the virus. The virus, once spread, can enable 
the enemy to conduct attacks on personnel, equipment, and data.            
The most likely threat situation would be that the UTACC system is subjected to a 
computer virus not specifically designed to attack UTACC. An example would be the 
UGV is discovered and a virus is uploaded onto the UGV which attempts to send 
information to attackers. The virus is discovered by network administrators at the 
firewall, because the data traffic is suspicious. Once discovered the UTACC system in 
question is isolated and the virus is removed.         
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD  
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 






IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
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operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc). 
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement port security for all external hardware connections (RG-45 
ethernet) to prevent unauthorized hardwire access to system components 
and information.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
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Impersonation or Spoofing an Unmanned 
Ground Vehicle (UGV) or Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
THREAT SUMMARY 
Impersonation or “spoofing” occurs when an illegitimate transmitter sends both 
correct and incorrect information, fooling the receiver into processing the illegitimate 
data [46]. A near-peer enemy has the technology available to spoof or impersonate a 
component of the UTACC system due to the system requirements for wireless 
communication links. The absence of a certification authority in ad hoc wireless networks 
allows a malicious node to spoof the identity of any node [47]. If the UGV is discovered 
or the enemy conducts a Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum analysis to determine the 
frequencies utilized by the UTACC system, then a receiver-transmitter can be constructed 
to impersonate the UGV and send false or incorrect information to the UTACC system 
and components.  
The most dangerous threat scenario would be the enemy gaining access to the 
specifications of the UTACC system and developing a receiver-transmitter to spoof the 
UGV. The enemy could locate and turn the UTACC UGV off while simultaneously 
turning on their illegitimate receiver-transmitter. The enemy could now receive UTACC 
system information or insert false information into the UTACC system, affecting decision 
making by the system or Marines.   
The most likely threat possibility would be the enemy constructing a receiver-
transmitter which would jam the UTACC system, without actually receiving information 
from or injecting false information into the system. The system would automatically 
switch to the secondary command and contol link or  enter a fully autonomous “get home 
control mode” enabling UTACC to return to a predetermined location without human 
interaction.   
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the UTACC system.       
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented. 
• Wireless communication links will be utilized by the UTACC system.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
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secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc). 
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement a fully autonomous get home control mode of operation 
(Shadow UAS). 
o Research alternative mobile ad-hoc networking protocols and strategies.  
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 Spoofing an Internet Protocol (IP) or Media 
Access Control (MAC) Address of a 
UTACC System Component.    
THREAT SUMMARY 
The UTACC system will employ IP/MAC addresses to route data between 
different components of the UTACC system. Spoofing an IP or MAC address is a 
common occurrence on computer networks. This type of attack is a viable option for 
attacking the UTACC system. MAC spoofing is the process of observing network traffic 
to obtain a legitimate MAC address and then impersonating that legitimate address [50]. 
MAC addresses can provide attackers with IP addresses of the spoofed computer through 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [50]. IP spoofing is a process used by attackers to 
gain network layer access to computers, by sending packets to a computer with a spoofed 
IP address of a trusted and legitimate host [50]. An attacker can capture packets to 
determine IP / MAC addresses and then modify the header information to show the 
packets are coming from a trusted IP /MAC address. The attacker could use their 
obtained access to insert viruses, employ a denial of service attack, or conduct a man-in-
the-middle attack.  
The most dangerous threat possibility would be an attacker spoofing an IP or 
MAC address of a UTACC system component and being able to conduct an attack on the 
entire network. An example would be that the attacker is eavesdropping on the wireless 
communication between UTACC system components and is able to obtain the IP address 
of the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV). This UTACC is wirelessly connected to the 
network. The attacker spoofs the IP address of the UGV and is able to connect to the 
network and gains access to launch more significant attacks. 
The most likely threat impact would be an attacker spoofing a IP or MAC address 
of the UTACC system and being able to observe data transmitted and received by other 
components of the UTACC system without impacting the entire network. An example 
would be an attacker spoofing the IP address of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and 
gaining the ability to receive information from the UGV.      
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD  
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 






IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will require some form of physical security to protect 
cryptographic material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data 
sharing. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
   
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
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operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc). 
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material. 
o Research alternative mobile ad-hoc networking protocols and strategies.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
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Unprotected Information Stored on the UTACC 
System 
THREAT SUMMARY 
The UTACC system will store data and information processed by onboard sensors. The 
information will be utilized by Marines to make decisions. If the information is not protected, 
then it is vulnerable to manipulation. The UTACC concept of operations places the system in the 
same place as the enemy, which enables access to system data and information. The UTACC will 
be the first system where unmanned air and ground vehicles collaborate to complete a task. The 
UGV portion of the UTACC system will be geographically co-located with enemy forces. The 
most commonly employed autonomous vehicles are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and they 
are not easily accessible by enemy forces. When the UTACC system is employed, the enemy 
may be able to obtain data and information stored onboard the UTACC system which could 
impact operations and security. Information security is the protection of information and 
information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information and must be 
achieved to enable employment of the UTACC system [29].      
The most dangerous threat possibility would be the UTACC system not employing an 
encryption solution and system information being accessed by the enemy. The enemy could 
utilize the information to locate and attack Marines. Most unmanned systems are not required to 
complete the DIACAP to be employed, which increases vulnerabilities and limits capabilities of 
the systems.    
The most likely threat possibility is the UTACC system is developed and because the 
system cannot attain a DIACAP certification an encryption solution is added as an afterthought 
instead of as a guiding principle. The system will experience an increase in cost and longer 
acquisition timelines.  
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• These threats if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
UTACC system.       
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and employment 
stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best common 
practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to the standards of 
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an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless man-
in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The system will require some form of physical security to protect cryptographic material 
and keys.   
• Network access is requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of life. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data sharing. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. Requirements 
lead to the development of system specifications which will drive operational 
employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-cycle. 
Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet the 
requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system completes the 
DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and policies 
which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the 
UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of operation, with 
which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they have employed in 
combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key pairs 
(public and private) and only the private key must be kept secret [35]. 
Public key cryptology is expensive and requires significant infrastructure 
[36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact that the 
same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key distribution 
issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, Passwords, 
and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement port security for all external hardware connections (RG-45 ethernet) to 
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prevent unauthorized hardwire access to system components and information.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and cryptographic 
material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the USMC 
communication architecture through best practices (boundary, firewall, router 
access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANS)). 
o Research and consider organic local data processing and deletion techniques to 
minimize data storage onboard UTACC. 
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APPENDIX O. FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT AND DE-
CONFLICTION 
THREAT AREA (PEOPLE, 
TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONS) 
Technology   
THREAT 
 
Frequency Management and De-confliction  
THREAT SUMMARY 
Electromagnetic (EM) operations involve operational planning and frequency 
management [29]. Operational planning is the ability to integrate EM spectrum-dependent 
systems in support of missions, and mitigate friendly or harmful interference [29]. UTACC must 
be integrated into the EM operational plan to mitigate interference. Frequency management is 
the process of requesting, recording, de-conflicting, and authorizing the frequencies for use [29]. 
The UTACC system must be allocated enough of the EM spectrum to operate effectively. The 
allocation of the EM spectrum must be sufficient to support frequency hopping to combat 
jamming, and to support redundant command and control (C2) and data links to each of the 
operational UTACC systems. Open frequencies are becoming less available, due to the amount 
of systems requiring the EM spectrum to perform critical tasks.   
 The UTACC system engineers and designers must research and identify open blocks of 
frequencies that meet the requirements of the UTACC system bandwidth to effectively mitigate 
frequency management issues. Frequency management issues will only worsen over time due to 
the constant process of acquiring new systems and equipment utilizing the EM spectrum.    
The most dangerous threat impact would be failing to properly identify UTACC 
frequency requirements before conducting the appropriate research of the EM spectrum. In this 
scenario, UTACC is funded and fielded but the Marines would be unable to obtain enough 
frequencies to operate the system in certain situations or environments. An example would be an 
insufficient frequency allocation to employ a frequency hopping technique to mitigate enemy 
jamming. The system is jammed and rendered combat ineffective.   
The most likely threat possibility would be that the development process is disrupted 
because research reveals the UTACC system specifications must change to ensure EM spectrum 
integration. For instance, the engineers and designers might determine that the UTACC system 
will utilize the L-band portion to meet system requirements, but find that this portion is 
extremely congested and the required spectrum cannot support the UTACC system. The 
engineers and designers are forced to use the C-band portion of the EM spectrum which requires 
different antennas and receiver-transmitters.     
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD  
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 





IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• When the UTACC system is designed, developed, and employed. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• The UTACC system will require frequencies to properly operate.  
• The system will employ frequency hopping schemes to defeat jamming.   
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. Requirements 
lead to the development of system specifications which will drive operational 
employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-cycle. 
Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet the 
requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system completes the 
DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and policies 
which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network security 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Research approaches used by other weapons and information systems. 
o Conduct extensive research of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum; identify 
frequency bandwidth requirements of the system, identify portions of the EM 
spectrum available for use, identify enough EM spectrum to facilitate frequency 
hopping to mitigate jamming. 
o Coordinate with USMC and DOD frequency management officials to ensure 
frequency availability. 
o Research the utilization of cognitive radios that seek open spectrum and ensure 
they are in compliance with USMC COMSEC procedures and the USMC and 
DOD frequency management policies.   
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine Corps 
personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat operations. 
o Employ a fully autonomous get home control mode of operation (Shadow UAS). 
o Employ redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the EM 
spectrum.  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations to mitigate the effects if one 
portion of the UTACC system is jammed.   
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UTACC System Integration with Legacy 
and Newly Procured Systems   
THREAT SUMMARY 
The UTACC system must be interoperable and communicate with legacy and 
newly fielded systems to enable collaboration and information sharing across the 
battlespace. The integration of systems is a difficult goal to accomplish in any enterprise, 
but more so in a large organization like the Marine Corps. Integration of software 
systems has become one of the most important and resource-consuming measures in 
software management [51]. The equipment procured in the next ten to fifteen years is still 
in the developmental stages, much like UTACC. An example of failed integration was 
the incompatibility of KC-130J Harvest Hawk weapons systems with the Remote Optical 
Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) III due to the downlink frequency on the KC-130J 
[52]. This was corrected when a new version of the ROVER was fielded, but possibly 
could have been avoided had the system been properly researched, evaluated, and tested 
prior to fielding.           
 Identifying enterprise systems (ES) that will interact and exchange data with the 
UTACC system is critical to achieve integration. ESs typically consist of legacy, custom, 
commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS), and proprietary software [51]. Identifying and planning 
the integration between UTACC and ES will be challenging. Information such as transfer 
protocols, data formats, schema, and content is essential in enabling collaboration 
between systems [51]. 
The most dangerous threat possibility is the UTACC system being incompatible 
with other equipment and enterprise systems which are already operational or being 
fielded by the Marine Corps. The inability to integrate with other systems will lead to the 
system being deemed ineffective by Marines. An example would be UTACC not 
integrating with an  intelligence system that might utilize data from UTACC to develop 
the enemy situation.   
The most likely threat impact will be that the UTACC may not initially integrate 
with systems not specifically identified in the requirements document. The UTACC 
system will be modified during follow-on upgrades that enable compatibility with these 
initially unidentifed systems. An example is the UTACC system failing to collaborate 
with a newly acquired handheld device procured by the Marine Corps. The failure might 
occur due to a transfer protocol, which would be identified and corrected via an upgrade 
during the operational and testing phase of development.      
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IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data 
sharing. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Require vendors to integrate UTACC with current and planned programs 
of record. 
o Procure government owned and operated software instead of vendor 
 99 
owned and operated. 
o Use a model driven development approach that produces end points that 
enable easier integration with other systems. 
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Utilize commonly used programming languages and standards.  
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Autonomous Software  
THREAT SUMMARY 
The UTACC system is intended to be semi-autonomous, allowing partial control 
to a human user. The autonomy software, however, possesses certain inherent threats that 
must be addressed and mitigated. Moving to a higher level of autonomous technology is 
challenging for the DOD because autonomous systems are primarily a software endeavor 
which is a shift away from the typical DOD hardware-centric development and 
acquisition process [53]. Autonomous software has the potential to be manipulated by our 
enemies.      
The UTACC concept of operations places the system with the enemy, which 
possibly gives the enemy access to the system. The UTACC system concept of operations 
is far more complex than current DOD unmanned systems. Currently autonomous 
software is most commonly employed on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). UAVs are 
not easily accessible by enemy forces. When the UTACC system is employed on the 
ground, the enemy may be able to manipulate the sensors to cause the UTACC system to 
act incorrectly, or manipulate the software to cause damage to the system or injure 
personnel. In recent years, autonomy as an aspect of diverse systems beyond DOD 
applications has been targeted by viruses which caused significant damage to hardware 
and software [54].      
Although the system software or hardware that enable HMI have not been 
developed there are many technological risks involved with this endeavor. The HMI will 
mostly be comprised of software code that will enable UTACC to integrate into and 
communicate with the reconnaissance team. Current semi-autonomous aerial vehicles are 
operated by Marines whose sole purpose is to remotely fly the aerial vehicle. A 
reconnaissance team does not possess the time or manpower to constantly operate a 
multi-agent robotic system like UTACC. Unlike current unmanned systems interaction, 
the UTACC HMI software will be loaded on system components that are co-located with 
the enemy, which requires security functions to recognize authorized and unauthorized 
users.   
The most dangerous possible threat would be the enemy discovering a limitation 
or fault in the autonomous software and using the system against friendly troops or 
causing it to damage itself. For instance UTACC might not recognize the enemy fighters 
as a threat. The enemy fighters could then make contact with the UTACC system and 
modify the software or code to attack friendly forces or itself.   
The most likely threat permutation would be the enemy discovering the Tactics 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the UTACC system and using the knowledge of 
the procedures to nullify the capabilities gained from the autonomy of the system. An 
example would be if the system does not operate optimally during heavy rains, the enemy 
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could conduct operations at this time.   
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat that could affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability.      
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing security for the system, unless man-in-
the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The system will require some form of physical security to protect cryptographic 
material and keys.   
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
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o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Research approaches used by other weapons and information systems. 
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement port security for all external hardware connections (RG-45 
ethernet) to prevent unauthorized hardwire access to system components 
and information.  
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
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Unencrypted Command and Control (C2 ) 
and Data Links  
THREAT SUMMARY 
Unencrypted Command and Control (C2) and data links are frequencies used to 
pass important information without utilizing encryption techniques. Current Marine 
Corps Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) utilize unencrypted C2 and data links [38]. 
While these usage patterns might suggest that communication links are safe, in fact they 
allow an enemy access to exploit myriad vulnerabilities, including eavesdropping, 
masquerading and virus insertion into our systems. The UTACC system could be more 
effective than our current unmanned systems by employing encryption techniques to 
protect C2 and data links.  
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the UTACC system being 
employed and a virus infecting   the network through an unencrypted C2 link. An 
example would be the enemy eavesdropping on an unencrypted C2 link, then 
masquerading an IP address of the UTACC system and uploading a virus, which impacts 
the entire network. 
The most likely threat impact would be the enemy receiving an unencrypted data 
feed from the UTACC system at the same time as friendly forces. An example would be 
that the enemy constructs a receiver that is tunable to the frequency of the data link and is 
viewing the data stream at the same time as the Marines employing the system.      
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the UTACC system.        
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• Network access is a requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
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• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data 
sharing. 
• Eavesdropping will happen regardless and this threat must be mitigated. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
  
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Research approaches used by other weapons and information systems. 
o Conduct extensive research of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum; 
identify frequency bandwidth requirements of the system, identify 
portions of the EM spectrum available for use, identify enough EM 
spectrum to facilitate frequency hopping to mitigate jamming. 
o Coordinate with USMC and DOD frequency management officials to 
ensure frequency availability. 
o Research the utilization of cognitive radios that seek open spectrum and 
ensure they are in compliance with USMC COMSEC procedures and the 
USMC and DOD frequency management policies.   
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Employ a fully autonomous get home control mode of operation (Shadow 
UAS). 
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations to mitigate the effects 
if one portion of the UTACC system is jammed. 
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Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI) 
Employment Onboard an Autonomous 
System 
THREAT SUMMARY 
Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI) are secure telecommunications or 
information-handling equipment, or associated cryptographic components that are 
controlled by the COMSEC Material Control System [55]. Current unmanned systems 
have a requirement to employ CCI to complete missions which could pose a significant 
risk to operations and security. The UTACC system will have similar requirements to 
current unmanned systems and should plan to have CCI onboard during operations.   In 
2012, a UAV crashed in Afghanistan; it had three CCI items onboard that had to be 
located, recovered and emptied of cryptographic keys. The Electronic Key Management 
System (EKMS)-1B sets the policies for issuing, accounting, handling, safeguarding, and 
disposing of COMSEC material and the policies relating to the application of COMSEC 
material [55]. Another concern is the cryptographic rollover timeline and how UTACC 
will conduct a rollover while in the field operating autonomously. If a wireless 
cryptographic rollover is conducted, this increases the risk of having the keys 
compromised by enemies. The UTACC system will be expected to maintain the practices 
and procedures seen in the EKMS 1B to employ COMSEC and meet the standards 
outlined in the EKMS 1B.   
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the enemy discovering our 
cryptographic keys and utilizing them to gain access to encrypted networks, data, and 
information. An example would be that the UTACC system endures a malfunction and 
the UAV or UGV becomes inoperable, giving the enemy access to the cryptology or 
controlled cryptographic items. The enemy would now be able to reverse engineer the 
technology to capture over-the-air transfers of keys.             
The most likely threat impact would be that the UTACC system has to disengage 
from an ongoing operation to conduct a cryptographic material rollover. An example 
would be the UTACC is being employed by a unit to locate a High Value Target (HVT) 
and at midnight the UTACC has to perform a cryptographic rollover, which pauses 
operations.         
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TARIAD  
 
• These threats if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the UTACC system.       




• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS  
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The system will require some form of physical security to protect cryptographic 
material and keys.   
• Network access is requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Utilize best common practices of the Internet Engineering Task Force by 
researching Request for Comments (RFC’s) for computer and network 
security 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous (man-in-the-loop) modes of 
operation, with which Marine Corps personnel are familiar and which they 
have employed in combat operations. 
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o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access controls through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
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Cost Threat to the UTACC System 
Research, Development, and Testing  
THREAT SUMMARY 
The current fiscally constrained environment of the Marine Corps will hinder or 
halt the development of the UTACC system. If UTACC is developed using new air/
ground vehicles, the cost increase could halt system research and development. The 
MCWL is currently researching and developing other Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV)/Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) to conduct other missions, which is 
documented in the MCWL campaign plan [56]. This duplication of manpower and 
money required to research and develop these similar autonomous systems may cause the 
UTACC system development to be canceled or postponed. Duplication of capabilities is 
another cost concern which could lead to the cancellation of UTACC. The UTACC 
system is being designed to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
to a squad of reconnaissance Marines [28]. These capabilities are currently being 
completed by other unmanned systems in the operational forces. The capabilities of the 
UTACC should exceed that of currently fielded unmanned systems.   
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the UTACC system not being 
developed, because it does not provide a unique and reliable set of capabilities to gain a 
share of funding.       
The most likely threat possibility would be the development of the UTACC 
systems being slowed due to budgetary reasons, even though some of the components 
required may already be owned or in testing by the Marine Corps.  
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The system will require some form of physical security to protect cryptographic 
material and keys.   
• Network access is requirement for the UTACC system. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• Each component of the UTACC system will be networked to facilitate data 
sharing. 
• The Statement of Work provided the only mission required of UTACC (ISR).  
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and publications 
must be analyzed to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Research the possibility of integrating UTACC software and mission sets 
into current MCWL systems and projects. The UTACC could leverage the 
cargo (Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and the Shrike and Stalker 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) efforts) as a test bed for the UGV and 
UAV of portions of the UTACC system.   
o Educate leaders and key decision makers on the UTACC system 
technology and capabilities.  
o Demonstrate the capabilities of the UTACC to Fleet Marine Force 
personnel and commands. 
 The UTACC system must validate reliability while highlighting 
capabilities during demonstrations. Results and conclusions of 
these demonstrations, plus theses, point papers and briefs should 
be published by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab to operational 
units.  
o Incorporate current operational or program of record unmanned systems 
into the UTACC system. Marines have familiarity with these systems. 
Utilizing unmanned aerial systems the Marine Corps has already 
purchased, like STUAS or Raven UASs. The Marines and decision makers 
are familiar with this equipment, making the transition easier for the 
Marines, while showcasing the UTACC system capabilities   
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Develop and adapt appropriate Measures of Performance (MOP) and 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).  
 113 
APPENDIX U. AIRSPACE INTEGRATION 





Airspace Integration   
THREAT SUMMARY 
The procurement and utilization of unmanned systems has increased significantly in 
recent years. The U.S. had fewer than 10 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in 2001 
and the fleet grew to 180 by 2007 [57]. Predator UAVs carried out 2,073 missions from June 
2005 until June 2006 [57]. Manned and unmanned aircraft are already taking a large share of the 
airspace system. UAVs operate either autonomously via onboard computers or sensors or semi-
autonomously (with a human in the loop). Fully and semi-autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles 
have the capability to operate at the same altitudes as manned aviation assets. The seamless 
integration of UTACC into an already crowded airspace system must occur before UTACC is 
ever employed in a real world scenario.  
Development of UTACC will require an in-depth study of current policies, procedures, 
and regulations that govern both the military and civilian utilization of the airspace system. The 
USMC currently utilizes three different types of UAVs. Larger UAVs like the Shadow and 
STUAS require adherence to the Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedure 
Standardization (NATOPS) and must be operated by trained Aerial Vehicle Operators (AVO) 
and Mission Commanders (MC) who are integrated into the Air Command Element (ACE). Both 
the Shadow and Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (STUAS) UAVs are classified as 
Group Three UAVs. The Shadow UAV operates between 4,000 and 10,000 feet Above Ground 
Level (AGL), while the STUAS UAV operates between 1,500 to 5,000 feet AGL [38]. Both the 
Shadow and STUAS will appear on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) with the operating times and 
altitude to integrate into the airspace with manned aviation assets [38]. The Shadow and STUAS 
UAVs are equipped with a transponder enabling positive and procedural control, which requires 
two way communication with the controlling agency (DASC/FAC) [38]. The smallest UAV 
operated by the Marine Corps is the Raven which may be a comparable size to the UTACC 
UAV. Raven UAVs operate at or below 1,200 feet AGL, which is coordinated by the battalion 
air officer to integrate with rotary wing assets and they do not require a trained MC or AVO to 
operate [38]. A detailed review of how current UAVs are employed by the Marine Corps will 
provide the foundation for integration of UTACC. As the UTACC design solidifies and as 
requirements increase, the size of the UAV will determine who and how the system will be 
employed. A completely autonomous air vehicle operating in congested airspace above a target 
or area of interest increases the risk of employing the UTACC system.  
The most dangerous variation of this threat would be UTACC being employed in support 
of a mission along with manned aviation assets. The UAV may be launched, without the 
knowledge of the aviators and a mid-air collision causes a mishap and destroys the aircraft and 
possibly kills the crew. 
The most likely threat permutation would be the UTACC UAV being grounded due to 
safety of flight concerns with manned aviation assets. A reconnaissance team does not possess 
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the resident expertise in airspace integration and will not employ the system if it endangers other 
airborne assets also supporting their mission.     
IMPACT TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Defense, and specifically the 
reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best common 
practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to the standards of 
an operational team member. 
• The UAV portion of the UTACC system will be grounded if integration is not achieved.  
 SECURITY CONTROLS 
  
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future FAA, DOD, and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific system requirements of the UAV.   
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will drive 
operational employment, training, and integration of the UAV.      
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support the 
UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Ensure integration within the airspace system in both a deployed and non-
deployed environment.  
• Technical Controls 
o Limit altitude and range of the UAV.  
o Identify UAV size and the equipment required (Identify Friend or Foe). 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation. 
o Implement Independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Ensure the UTACC mission planning component includes parameters to ensure 
integration with manned aviation assets and aviation command and control units.  
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APPENDIX V. SURFACE SPACE INTEGRATION OF UTACC   





Surface Space Integration of UTACC   
THREAT SUMMARY 
The procurement and utilization of unmanned ground systems will increase as 
technological advances occur. Civilian companies, like Torc Robotics, are on the cutting 
edge of technology in regards to Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV), and have 
developed new ways to ensure the navigation and route selection of these vehicles. The 
ability to integrate UGVs into high traffic areas such as urban areas, freeways, and into 
Marine Corps convoys and vehicle formations has not been fully developed and tested 
because the U.S. military has up to now used UGVs to conduct Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) missions [57].   
Surface space integration is key to the success of the UTACC system. The system 
must keep intervals with manned vehicles, maintain a safe speed, maintain march 
discipline, and must not become a hindrance to the Marines or the mission [58]. The 
UGV must be able to discern obstacles and hazards, and be able to identify people as 
threats and non-threats. It also must prioritize the lives of Marines and civilians above its 
survival.   
The most dangerous threat possibility would be that the UTACC is employed in 
support of a mission, integrated with manned vehicles, and either injures or kills a Marine 
or civilian or damages other equipment essential to the mission. An example would be 
that the UTACC UGV is trying to avoid an obstacle in the road and a Marine or civilian 
walks into the alternate path. The UGV hits the Marine or civlian, resulting in their death.  
The most likely threat scenario is that the UGV portion of the UTACC gets 
trapped in an urban area due to enemy or obstacles. The UGV will not be recovered and 
the equipment is lost to the enemy or destroyed. An example would be the UGV making 
a turn onto a crowded street and being surrounded by people, and unable to turn around; 
the enemy is able to apprehend the UGV without any engagement.     
 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD  
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• The UGV loss is an acceptable loss compared to that of innocent non-combatants 
and Marines. 
SECURITY CONTROLS 
    
• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC UGV requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the UGV. 
o Classify and protect UTACC system software throughout system life-
cycle. Procure and manufacture components from trusted companies.  
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security. 
o Ensure integration within the surface space system in both a deployed and 
non-deployed environment.  
o Extensive research of convoy operations, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) and Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTP). 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Extensive testing and evaluation with operational units.  
o Research lessons learned from the “Google Car” and companies like Torc 
Robotics.    
• Technical Controls 
o Limit speed and range of the UGV in certain environments or situations.  
o Identify size and weight requirements of the UGV  
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation. 
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
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APPENDIX W. HUMAN MACHINE INTERACTION 
THREAT AREA (PEOPLE, 
TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONS) 
Technology/Operations/People   
THREAT 
 
Human Machine Interaction (HMI)  
THREAT SUMMARY 
            Human Machine Interaction (HMI) spans the three threat areas of People, 
Technology, and Operations and is the linchpin of UTACC. The People aspect of the 
HMI threat is seen in Appendix D (Attitude Towards Emerging Technologies), the 
Technology aspect of the HMI threat is seen in Appendix Q (Autonomous Software), and 
the Operations aspect of HMI will be explained in this template.   The HMI software 
must enable simple and effortless interaction of system command and control (C2) and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission data. The HMI software is 
what will operationally enable UTACC to integrate into the reconnaissance team and 
become a team member. The HMI software development is critical in overcoming 
potential shortfalls in robot and human teams. The end state of UTACC should be to 
allow Marines to focus on the mission and not on the controller of an autonomous 
system.   
The HMI software threat to operations is when it fails to provide the operational 
capabilities outlined initially by the Statement of Work (SOW) between the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) and the 
Marines testing the UTACC system. Failing to integrate UTACC at the team level will 
put the team of Marines at risk. The HMI must significantly minimize the operator 
interaction over current systems while providing capabilities to accomplish multiple 
mission sets [28]. Operationally the HMI software must both transmit and receive 
communication through multiple mediums to truly integrate into a reconnaissance team. 
Marines on the battlefield communicate with each other in many different and unique 
methods. UTACC must be adaptable to these different methods of communication and 
immediately perform actions based on the information received from teammates. The 
UTACC HMI must also alert and display to team members operationally relevant and 
timely mission information. The UTACC system will be operating in a dynamic 
environment in which every situation cannot be foreseen or predicted. The system 
developers must capture as much operational information about the team employing 
UTACC to provide a fully assimilated and operationally capable system.   
The most dangerous threat impact would be that the UTACC HMI does not 
reduce operator interation. The system does not improve current HMI and this causes the 
death of Marines. For instance Marines are employing the system and it requires a 
significant amount of interaction from a team member. That team member is also 
responsible for security of a certain area, which is breached because the Marine is 
focused on UTACC. The enemy identifies and kills the Marines.     
The most likely threat permutation would be the UTACC concept of operations is 
too complex to enable the required level of HMI at this point in time. Research and 
development continues and allows for technology to advance to a point where the HMI 
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can be reliably employed on a battlefield.    
 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability, if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• HMI is not technically mature enough to operate effectively in combat.  




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Develop the UTACC system security policies and procedures which meet 
the requirements of the DOD and USMC. Ensure the UTACC system 
completes the DIACAP process, which ensures the system meets DOD 
requirements for IA.   
o Educate leaders and key decision makers on the UTACC system 
technology and capabilities.  
o Demonstrate the capabilities of the UTACC to Fleet Marine Force 
personnel and commands. 
 The UTACC system must validate reliability while highlighting 
capabilities during demonstrations. Results and conclusions of 
these demonstrations, plus theses, point papers and briefs should 
be published by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab to operational 
units.  
o Incorporate current operational or program of record unmanned systems 
into the UTACC system. Marines have familiarity with these systems.    
o Research the ability to incorporate current operational or program of 
record unmanned systems into the UTACC system. Marines have 
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familiarity with these systems.    
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit. This includes pre-
deployment training packages.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation with operational units. 
o Extensive research of the information exchange process and requirements 
for the UTACC system.  
• Technical Controls 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, with which 
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APPENDIX X. RECONNAISSANCE TEAM EMPLOYMENT OF 
UTACC 





Reconnaissance Team Employment of 
UTACC 
THREAT SUMMARY 
The proposed operational employment context of the UTACC system with a 
USMC reconnaissance team may not be the best fit for a system of this size and scope. 
These teams work well because of their ability to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy 
and the terrain for future operations, while remaining undetected and uncompromised 
[59]. The UTACC system adds a significant physical footprint to a small team that is 
used to operating with limited equipment, connectivity and in austere conditions on a 
mission that may take a significant amount of time. Some insertions/extractions must be 
timed to coincide with particular lighting, weather, or tidal conditions [59]. Operating 
with UTACC, the reconnaissance team has to accomplish the location, camouflage, and 
concealment of themselves and the system. Reconnaissance teams rely on stealthy 
maneuvering, timely and accurate intelligence reporting, and information obtained 
without enemy knowledge [59]. To maximize effectiveness, reconnaissance units must be 
able to approach the enemy, the Named Areas of Interest (NAI), or other objectives 
uncompromised [59]. Remaining uncompromised and in advantageous positions while 
conducting reconnaissance missions will be increasingly difficult with the physical 
components of UTACC. 
The most dangerous threat permutation would be discovery of the system through 
observation of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) 
or the digital footprint of UTACC which leads to the discovery of the team. An example 
would be that the enemy discovers the UGV/UAV which leads to the discovery and kill/
capture of the reconaissance team and ultimate mission failure.  
The most likely threat possibility would be discovery of the system which puts the 
mission at risk. It is the mission of the reconnaissance team to locate the enemy and 
establish patterns of behavior. If the UAV or UGV is seen or heard the enemy will 
change their patterns which is the mission of the reconnaissance  team to locate and 
pattern the enemy.  
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This threat if not mitigated will impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability 





IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• When the UTACC system is employed in an operational environment by a 
reconnaissance team.         
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing security for the system, unless man-in-
the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The UTACC system will increase the physical and digital footprint of a 
reconnaissance team.    
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Ensure integration within the surface space system in both a deployed and 
non-deployed environment.  
o Extensive research of convoy operations, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) and Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTP). 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Extensive testing and evaluation with operational units to determine best 
fit for the USMC.    
o Research power generation methods other than traditional methods to 
increase operational endurance. 
o Research and employ camouflage and concealment technologies for the 
UTACC system to employ. 
o Research technologies to maintain light discipline during nighttime 
operations. 
o Research and employ noise dampening technology. 
o Research emerging cloaking technologies.  
• Technical Controls  
o Identify size and weight requirements of the UGV  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Implement cryptographic solutions:  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
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pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access control through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
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APPENDIX Y. SURVIVABILITY OF THE SYSTEM FROM 
ENEMY WEAPONRY    






Survivability of the System from Enemy 
Weaponry    
THREAT SUMMARY 
The enemy has a wide range of weapons from small arms to precision missiles. 
The UTACC system will be targeted by these weapons and must meet military standards 
that protect equipment from this threat. Currently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are 
targeted primarily by enemy small arms fire and anti-air artillery weapons [38]. The 
UTACC UAV will be subjected to these same weapons, but the Unmanned Ground 
Vehicle (UGV) will be the most vulnerable component because it is geographically co-
located with enemy forces. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) survivability is achieved by 
reducing the vulnerability of the total system to include the ground control systems, 
vehicles, and the Marines that operate and maintain the systems [38]. These current 
UASs have ground components that are not employed in the same locations or with the 
same mission as the UTACC UGV.   UTAAC will require some type of physical and 
connective security measures to protect and control a degraded UTACC system or 
components. UTACC must implement both strategies to protect and prevent affects from 
enemy weaponry. Steps to protect UTACC from enemy weaponry include adding a type 
of armor that protects the system. Measures to prevent UTACC from being targeted by 
enemy weaponry include concealment and camouflage to system components.    
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the absolute destruction of the 
UTACC system by an explosion or direct fire from enemy weapons. An example of this 
would be the UAV being targeted by an anti-air missile or the UGV hitting an improvised 
explosive device (IED). If the UTACC is profoundly disabled and the oboard informaiton 
cannot be deleted remotely, the information may be extracted and used by the enemy. 
The enemy would be able to replicate and reverse engineer the technology which would 
greatly impact future employment of the system.   
The most likely threat impact would be the system coming into contact with 
enemy forces and certain components being damaged. An example of this would be the 
UGV/UAV being engaged by enemy forces and losing a sensor and a communications 
link. This loss would degrade the UTACC system but would not result in a complete 
system failure.   
 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
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IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• UTACC is vulnerable to this threat during the design, development, and 
employment stages when a malicious actor has the ability to access the system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing security for the system, unless man-in-
the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Training pipeline for leaders, planners, operators, and maintainers to 
support the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Extensive research of convoy operations, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) and Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTP). 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Extensive testing with operational units to determine best fit for the 
USMC.    
o Research and employ technologies to provide protection of critical 
UTACC system components (armor). 
o Research power generation methods other than traditional methods to 
increase operational endurance. 
o Research and employ camouflage and concealment technologies for the 
UTACC system to employ. 
o Research and employ technologies to maintain light discipline during 
nighttime operations. 
o Research and employ noise dampening technology. 
o Research emerging cloaking technologies.  
• Technical Controls  
o Identify size and weight requirements of the UGV  
o Employ independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Implement cryptographic Solutions  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
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significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access control through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement redundant sensors.      
o Employ Defense Electronic Counter-Measures (DECM) (Chaff, Flare, 
Radar). 
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APPENDIX Z. ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS 





Environmental Threats  
THREAT SUMMARY 
Current Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) cannot effectively 
operate in the rain and provide limited operational capabilities in hot, sandy, or dusty 
environments. The Shadow UAS cannot be operated in rain; however, the Small Tactical 
UAS (STUAS) can operate in light rain [38]. UTACC must overcome the environmental 
limitations of current Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 
Limitations of current UASs include: the inability to operate in heavy rain and excessive 
heat, require manual switching between day electro-optical (EO) and night Infrared (IR) 
sensors, and are vulnerable to space weather effects, low cloud decks, sea state/sea spray, 
and high altitude environments [38]. 
Per the Statement of Work (SOW) between the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) the system must be able to withstand a 
wind speed of 15 knots minimum, operate in sandy and dusty environments (MIL-STD-
810G, 510.6), and rain (MIL-STD 810G, 506.5) [28]. These requirements provide initial 
specifications but must be refined to include the full spectrum of environmental 
possibilities in which UTACC will be expected to operate.   
The most dangerous environmental threat impact would be that UTACC system 
or its components are damaged, destroyed, cause a mishap or are lost due to 
environmental conditions. For example the UTACC Unmanned Aerial Vehicle might be 
conducting a mission and an unexpected thunderstorm arises in the operational area. The 
UAV crashes into a populated area and kills innocent civilians or friendly forces.   
The most likely environmental threat possibility is that weather negates the 
capabilities of a specific system component, like the UAV. For instance, heavy rains and 
cloud cover prevent the UAV from launching and is not employed. The Unmanned 
Ground Vehicle (UGV)   is still able to provide limited capabilities and is employed 
independently of the UAV. The Marines will overcome the limitations of the air vehicle, 
but will have less faith in the system as a whole. 
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 







IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• Environmental effects will limit capabilities provided by portions of or the entire 
UTACC system. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, maintainers, and operators 
to support the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Achieve MIL-STD for electrical wiring and electronic components.  
o Adhere to USMC Communications Security (COMSEC) standards and 
policies which includes physical, cryptographic, transmission, and 
emission security.   
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Extensive system testing to determine limitations with regards to 
environmental effects.    
o Achieve the minimum MIL-STD referenced for rain, wind, dusty 
environments. 
o Research technologies that enable waterproofing of UTACC (Nano 
coatings). 
o Establish corrosion prevention requirements and maintenance procedures. 
o Research and conduct a cost benefit analysis of employing low cost throw-
away unmanned vehicles. 
• Technical Controls  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Research and employ ruggedized components that protect against 
environmental effects (rain, wind, sand) 
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement redundant sensors.   
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APPENDIX AA. TERRAIN 







The UTACC system must be functional in most terrains to provide sustained 
capabilities to Marines. The Statement of Work (SOW) specifies high and low altitudes, 
open desert, thick vegetation and canopy cover, rocky cliffs and mountainous terrain, as 
well as urban environments [28]. Expeditionary Force 21 states that the ability to conduct 
amphibious assaults on littoral terrain such as islands, archipelagos, straits, or shorelines 
for future operations is imperative [60]. These requirements provide initial specifications 
but must be refined to include any terrain in which UTACC will be expected to operate. 
The UTACC system design must be able to operate in all the above terrains to be 
considered an asset to the Marine Corps and Future Maritime Operations (FMO).   
Different altitudes and terrains introduce different challenges to line of sight 
(LOS) communications links, maneuverability, speed, and visibility from both the 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) perspectives. 
Speed and surprise are key tenets in “maneuver warfare,” which is the basis for Marine 
Corps doctrine [61]. For this system to provide an increased capability to the warfighter it 
must overcome the limitations of assets that currently conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. With current unmanned systems, terrain affects 
launch and recovery sites. The Shadow Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) requires a 
runway for operations and the Small Tactical UAS (STUAS) requires a landing zone 
(LZ) for launch and recovery operations [38]. These requirements slow operational tempo 
and this is an area where UTACC could provide unique capabilities to support maneuver 
warfare.    
The most dangerous threat impact of operating on challenging terrain is that the 
UTACC UGV becomes immobilized and is unable to provide a platform for UAV 
operations or provide ground-based ISR. For instance the UGV could roll over on 
mountainous terrain. The UAV then cannot take off or land from the UGV, causing 
mission failure. The system in this scenario provides no capabilities to the team, and at 
this point is a liability. 
The most likely threat possibility would be that the terrain negatively impacts the 
system, but not the mission itself. An example would be the UAV is not operational due 
to mountainous terrain impacting communication and data links, but the UGV can still 
effectively complete its portion of the mission. The Marines will overcome the 
limitations of the air vehicle, but will have less faith in the system and have far less 
situational awareness than if the system was fully functional in this terrain.       
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INMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD  
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• Portions of the UTACC system will be left unattended if it cannot traverse the 
terrain.  
• Terrain will limit UTACC system capabilities. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 




• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific UTACC system requirements. 
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system. 
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, maintainers, and operators 
to support the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct extensive testing and evaluation to determine limitations with 
regards to terrain.    
o Achieve the minimum requirements for traverse ability (incline, altitude, 
etc). 
• Technical Controls  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Research and employ ruggedized components that protect against 
environmental effects (rain, wind, sand) 
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement redundant sensors.  
o Ensure the Mission Planning software accounts for terrain limitations of 
the system.  
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APPENDIX BB. SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS 







Future Maritime Operations (FMO) will be the primary focus of concept-based 
experimentation in FY2015 and if UTACC cannot integrate into this environment it will 
not be fully researched and developed [56]. An example of FMO integration would be 
enhancing Command and Control (C2) enablers and ship-to-shore connectors, which are 
areas of interest in the MCWL campaign plan [56]. Expeditionary Force 21 predicts that 
the future operations of the Marine Corps will be in the littorals and missions are likely to 
involve maritime operations [60]. 
The naval platform from which UTACC will be based and operated has unique 
physical and environmental characteristics. Depending on the type of operations required 
of the unit employing the UTACC system, the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) must be able to perform certain functions aboard the 
ship in order to be effective. The UGV might be required to move either autonomously or 
semi-autonomously onboard the ship to enable embarkation and de-embarkation of the 
system. The UAV could possibly conduct missions from the ship and would require 
takeoff and recovery operations from a moving platform. Additionally, maintenance must 
be performed within the confined spaces of a ship. The shipboard environment also 
introduces salt water and extreme temperatures, which negatively impacts 
communication and autonomous systems [38]. 
A network component threat exists when connecting a Marine Corps system into 
the Navy’s shipboard communication architecture and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. 
The RQ-7 Shadow UAS and RQ-11 Raven UAS are not shipboard capable, which 
severely impacts ship-to–shore capabilities [38]. For UTACC to be successful it must 
integrate into shipboard operations.   
The most dangerous threat impact of shipboard operations is the incompatibility 
of systems and the inability of the system to operate on the ship. An example of this 
would be the UGV not being able to move itself in the well deck or onto a Landing Craft 
Air Cushion (LCAC) when needed due to the ship moving underneath it. Additionally, 
the incompatibility of systems would leave the unit commander without a communication 
link to the UTACC system from the Landing Forces Operations Center (LFOC) for 
common full motion video feeds. 
The most likely threat is limiting the capability of the UTACC system. An 
example of this is the inability of the UAV to take off and land on a ship, due to winds, 
frequency confliction with the Navy, or UAV / UGV design. Ship to shore operations are 
extremely complex and if the UTACC is to be successful in the Marine Corps it must 
provide the ability to assist in power projection from ship-to-shore.  
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IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 
available for use in operations. 
 
IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• When the UTACC system is employed onboard ship or requires systems 










• Non-technical Controls 
o Analyze current and future DOD, DoN, USMC policies, procedures and 
publications to determine specific system requirements of UTACC.   
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of UTACC.      
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, maintainers, and operators 
to support the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Conduct testing and integration during shipboard operations and networks 
(ISR, SATCOM, UHF, EHF). 
o Research and testing of UAV and UGV operations from a moving ship 
(launch, recovery, and embarkation)   
o Achieve MIL-SPEC wiring and communications circuits to avoid issues 
from salt water and extreme temperatures. 
o Research technologies that enable waterproofing of UTACC (Nano 
coatings). 
• Technical Controls  
o Independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Establish simplified maintenance procedures that are enabled while 
embarked on a ship (space constraints). 
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Research and employ ruggedized components that protect against 
environmental effects (rain, wind, sand, salt water) 
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement redundant sensors.  
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APPENDIX CC. OPERATIONAL ENDURANCE 







           Reconnaissance teams conduct both mounted and dismounted operations. Though 
it is a goal of UTACC to be integrated into dismounted operations it will be easier for 
UTACC to be integrated into mounted operations. Ground mobility assets enable 
reconnaissance teams to conduct reconnaissance missions of extended range and duration 
[59]. The UTACC system could be more easily integrated into mounted operations due to 
organic logistical support.   The UTACC system could provide additional transport and 
organic intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to the team.   
           A reconnaissance team can conduct dismounted operations for a minimum of 
ninety-six hours with little or no external direction or support while maintaining 
themselves and their equipment [59]. Their equipment and supplies include only what 
can be carried on foot while operating dismounted [59]. Reconnaissance Marines will not 
have support capabilities, such as generators, extra batteries, or fuel, during missions. In 
order to integrate into dismounted operations the UTACC system must be self-sustaining 
for the minimum ninety-six hour time period. UTACC must be self-contained and may be 
forced to provide its own battery storage, power generation capabilities (solar power), 
and fuel. Another concern of the UTACC system in this environment is system 
maintenance. The UTACC system needs to be simply designed, so that a team of Marines 
in the field can maintain it with minimal equipment.  
The most dangerous threat permutation would be the UTACC system being 
unable to operate for the minimum 96 hour time period for dismounted operations, 
without external logistical support. This would lead to the team not employing the 
UTACC system for dismounted operations which is a goal of UTACC. 
The most likely threat impact is that the UTACC system would only be operable 
for a limited time with minimal mantainance or significant recharging. An example of 
this would be UTACC being operational for 2 out of the 4 days needed for a mission. 
After those 2 days the team would either need to evacuate or hide the UTACC system. If 
the system is not operational the Marines would have to manually move the system to the 
extraction point or shut the system down to save enough power and fuel to retrograde the 
system. This would minimize the capability provided by the UTACC system.  
IMPACTS TO THE CIA TRIAD 
 
• This is a threat to availability; if the threat is not mitigated the system will not be 




IMPACTS TO UTACC 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
• When the UTACC system is employed in an operational environment by a 




• Reconnaissance community will not change their SOP’s, doctrine, and best 
common practices to enable the utilization of poor technology that cannot adapt to 
the standards of an operational team member. 
• The system has to be able to be left behind in the event of an emergency or loss of 
life. 
• The Reconnaissance team is not providing constant security for the system, unless 
man-in-the-loop weapon systems are implemented.   
• The team will not carry excessive amounts of additional gear to support the 
UTACC system. 
• The UTACC system will increase the physical and digital footprint of a 
reconnaissance team.    
SECURITY CONTROLS 
 
• Non-technical Controls 
o Current and future DOD and USMC policies, procedures and publications 
must be analyzed to determine specific system requirements of UTACC.   
Requirements lead to the development of system specifications which will 
drive operational employment, training, and integration of the system.      
o Establish training pipeline for leaders, planners, and operators to support 
the UTACC system employment by a USMC unit.  
o Ensure integration within the surface space system in both a deployed and 
non-deployed environment.  
o Extensive research of convoy operations, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP) and Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTP). 
o Continue development of the UTACC concept of operations. 
o Extensive testing and evaluation with operational units to determine best 
fit for the USMC.    
o Research power generation methods other than traditional methods to 
increase operational endurance. 
o Research and employ camouflage and concealment technologies for the 
UTACC system to employ. 
o Research technologies to maintain light discipline during nighttime 
operations. 
o Research and employ noise dampening technology. 
o Research emerging cloaking technologies.  
o Research the mission sets that enable UGV employment.  
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o Research the possibility of an unmanned re-supply concept for UTACC to 
increase UTACC system range.  
• Technical Controls  
o Identify size and weight requirements of the UGV  
o Implement independent UGV and UAV operations. 
o Employ mandatory semi-autonomous modes of operation, which Marine 
Corps personnel are familiar with and have employed in combat 
operations. 
o Implement cryptographic Solutions  
 Asymmetric (Public key) cryptography is based on the use of key 
pairs (public and private) and only the private key must be kept 
secret [35]. Public key cryptology is expensive and requires 
significant infrastructure [36].   
 Symmetric (Secret key) cryptography is characterized by the fact 
that the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt data [35]. The key 
distribution issues are present within symmetric cryptography [36]. 
o Implement access control through authentication (Login Information, 
Passwords, and Biometrics). 
o Implement access control through privileges (System administrators, 
users, etc).  
o Implement a “two person rule” for system administrators to reduce errors 
and tampering. 
o Research and employ tamper resistant technology.  
o Research and employ ruggedized components that protect against 
environmental effects (rain, wind, sand, salt water) 
o Implement a remote zeroing capability of software, data, and 
cryptographic material.  
o Implement redundant and encrypted C2 and data links spread across the 
EM spectrum.  
o Implement redundant sensors.   
o Ensure the UTACC network communication links are separated from the 
USMC communication architecture through best practices (boundary, 
firewall, router access control lists, Virtual Local Area Networks 
(VLANS)). 
o Onboard storage for batteries, fuel, maintenance equipment. 
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